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Abstract 
Control of Hospital strategy in Small Multihospital Systems 
Lora Hanson Warner, :Eh.D.  
Virginia Comrronwealth University 
Major Director: Dr. James W.  Begun 
Hospitals are joining multihospital systems (MHSs) with growin;J 
frequency. About 80% of MHSs are small , � of 2-7 hospitals .  
An inp:)rtant management issue in MHSs is the extent to which member 
hospitals retain control over their avn strategic directions. 
usin;J a contingency framework, this study uses both system arrl 
hospital-level detenninants to explain the extent to which hospital 
members of MHSs control their avn strategies. SUrvey arrl secorrlary 
data from 272 member hospitals of 62 small multihospitals systems 
(size 2-7 hospitals) are analyzed. System dispersion, size, owner­
ship, strategic type, arrl age along with hospital occupancy, size, 
relationship to the MHS ,  arrl market factors· are detenninants of 
hospital control of strategy. 
'lWo types of hospital strategic decisions were reVealed by 
factor analysis: tactical arrl periodic. For tactical decisions, 
such as those relatin;J to hospital budgets, service additions, arrl 
fonnulation of strategies, catholic system ownership is a sig­
nificant predictor of greater hospital control . Prospector system 
strategy arrl older system age are significant predictors of reduced 
hospital control . For periodic decisions, such as appointment of 
hospital board members , sale of hospital assets ,  arrl changes in 
bylaws, older system age is negatively associated with hospital 
control , and a hospital which is owned by the system has 
significantly less control . 
'!he results are analyzed using the framework of the Hickson, 
Butler, Cray, Mallory, & Wilson (1986) typology of strategic 
decisions . '!hus the results of this work can be useful to managers 
in identifying the nature of a decision and understanding its 
associated decision process . 
QlAPI'ER 1 :  INI'ROIXJcrION 
Recent changes in the health care delivery system in the United 
states are well known to consumers, providers , managers, and academ­
ics who interact in and observe the industry . One major new devel­
opment has been the consolidation of previously independent hospi­
tals into corporate organizations and affiliations . Managers of 
these hospitals often believe that the hospital can benefit from 
membership in a multi-hospital system (MHS) by having greater access 
to capital resources, managerial expertise, or market power (Ennann 
and Gabel, 1985) . 
While hospitals enjoy numerous benefits from corporate member­
ship, they nrust pay certain costs, including some loss of autonomy . 
Upon joining a multihospital system, a hospital may be compelled to 
surrender control over certain functions to corporate decision­
makers . While it is conunon for hospitals to maintain control over 
operational , daily decisions, it is .less obvious who shoUld make the 
member hospital ' s  long tenn, policy-related and strategic decisions . 
The effective integration of a hospital into a corporate system in 
large part depends upon successful resolution of this control issue, 
since a hospital's strategy is the core of its purpose and mission. 
The purpose of this study is to explain the amount of control 
that hospital members of small MHSs hold over their strategies, as 
1 
opposed to having them controlled by the system' s  co:r:porate compon­
ent. '!he most important factors which influence this control of 
decision-making will be identified. 
2 
Specifically, a multihospital system is defined as "two or IOC>re 
non-federal, non-state acute care hospitals that are owned , leased, 
or managed by a single co:r:porate entity" (Morlc:x::k, Alexarrler, & 
Hunter, 1985) . Table 1 illustrates the scope of this consolidation 
for the year 1985 , when approxiInately 35% of all comrmmity hospitals 
were members of 250 MHSs (American Hospital Association [AHA] , 
1985) . larger systems, because they are highly visible and active 
on a national level , have attracted the most media attention. Small 
systems , despite being in the majority (about 80% of MHSs have fEMer 
than eight hospitals) ,  are often overlooked in descriptions of 
recent health care delivery system development. Moreover, small 
systems represent all ownership types , with 90% of the not-for­
profit and 55% of the investor-owned systems having less than eight 
hospitals (AHA, 1985) . 
Research findings on management in large MHSs cannot neces­
sarily be applied to the management of small systems . D6cision­
maJd.n;J processes differ greatly, for example, between a system 
composed of four hospitals operating within the same geographic 
region and a system of 40 hospitals distributed throughout the 
united states . Thus the present research will serve to expand the 
knowledge base that MHS and member hospital administrators can draw 
upon in managing small multi-hospital systems . 
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Table 1 
Number of Multihospital Systems by ownership and Size, 1985 
SYSTEM SIZE SYSTEM OWNERSHIP 
(# member 
hospitals) 
Church- Not-for Investor-
catholic other Profit owned 'IDI'AIS 
2 27 4 41 2 74 
3 25 3 18 4 50 
4-5 15 4 20 5 44 
6-7 7 3 11 6 27 
8+ 24 7 10 14 55 
98 21 100 3 1  250 
Source: American Hospital Association, 1985 
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strategy-Making for MHS Hospitals 
strategy-making is broadly viewed as a process of decision-making 
which occurs at multiple levels within a finn (Mintzberg, 1983 ) . In­
fluence over outcomes can take place at several points in the process . 
Comrronly, subunit managers provide decision-related infonoation to 
upper level decision-makers, selectively reporting or withholding rele­
vant materials ani influencing the decision. 'Ihese subunits have a 
unique lower-level, operationally-based perspective of the finn ' s  ac­
tivities . In contrast, the finn ' s  executives have the perspective of 
the business ' overall perfo:nnance , ani retain the ultimate authority 
over ani responsibility for the decisions (Mintzberg, 1983 ) . 
Organizational strategic planning has been defined as "a dynamic 
interactive process between the envirornnent ani the organization" 
(Shortell,  Morrison, & Robbins, 1986) . Organizations differ in the 
extent to which they fonoalize the process of strategy-making, with 
some developing a highly structured decision-making process which en­
corrpasses a review of goals, mission, internal strengths ani weaknes­
ses, ani external opportunities or threats to the organization. In 
other finns, strategies may manifest themselves in a Consistent "stream 
of ilnportant decisions over time" (Mintzberg, 1978) rather than being 
stated explicitly. Common to these approaches are decisions which seek 
to move the organization in directions which are adaptive given the 
envirornnental circumstances. 
In hospitals ani MHSs , decision-making processes ani the organiza­
tional structures developed to facilitate them must be examined with 
recognition of the unique features of the health care induscry. Health 
care is a heavily regulated irrlustry with atypical consumer demand, 
insurance-induced incentives, am strong local dominance through the 
influence of medical staffs . Hospitals, prior to membership in the 
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system, were irrlependent "carrpanies" rather than expansions from a base 
business . Moreover, hospitals are organizations with long histories 
am strong traditions of irrlependent functioning, am most are new to 
multi-institutional forms (starr , 1982 ) . 
'Ihe strong irrlependent traditions are reflected in the structuring 
of many multihospital systems, in which hospitals often are loosely am 
infonnally linked to a corporate structure . As Weick ( 1976) describes 
such organizations, 
• • •  loosely coupled organizations are responsive to events in 
other organizations but preserve their own identities am 
separateness. 'Ihe attachment may be circumscribed, infre­
quent, weak, unilnportant, or slow to respond • • •  subcomponents 
can achieve their own adaptations with local subenvirons. 
This structuring promotes flexibility am adaptability for the finn am 
its subunits. Weick ( 1976) observes that problems in one subunit do 
not strongly influence the activities of other subunits : "external 
events do not ramify throughout the system • • •  " 
It is clear that unique strategies must be developed for each c0m­
ponent of the MHS, based upon local constraints and opportunities . Yet 
these individual strategies nn.lSt provide for the accomplishment of the 
overall corporate plan. Hospital strategic planning is the key point 
of integration bebveen a hospital and its corporate leadership. Within 
a multihospital system, hospital-level strategies nn.lSt be constructed 
in such a way as to enact the broader corporate strategies . Hospital 
strategy-making is the process of reconciling hospital goals am objec-
tives with system-level goals and objectives . 
Relatively little research has thoroughly explored hospital stra­
tegy-making within a MHS ,  and most of what has been done has examined 
the topic tangentially. Alexarrler and SChroer ( 1985) and Alexarrler 
( 1985) , using the same AHA data base of 160 hospital systems, each 
looked at the overall extent of decentralized management within MHSs 
and then addressed specific decision areas, including the responsibil­
ity for hospital strategic decision-making. '!he results showed a wide 
variation among systems across system size, age, and ownership, and 
yielded no conclusive model of decision-making relationships with 
regard to the strategies for member hospitals. Illlportantly, no hospi­
tal level measures were incorporated in these analyses as detenninants 
of the locus of control over hospital strategy. 
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In a smaller survey, Kleiner ( 1984 ) intexviewed 42 administrators 
in 11 MHSs about their roles and interactions with corporate leaders 
for various types of decisions, including strategic planning. IG.einer 
fourrl several differences in strategy-making processes between not-for­
profit and investor-owned systems , principally that administrators in 
not-for-profit MHSs were involved with their local boards to a much 
greater extent than were investor-owned administrators, who interacted 
rnuch more extensively with the corporate planning staff. 
'!hese studies are the only two which have specifically focused 
upon control of strategic decision-making for member hospitals in MHSs , 
and they are not conclusive. More research with specific attention to 
this issue is necessary to further understand the decision-making pro­
cesses which exist in these relatively new organizational fonns . 
Figure 1 
Analytical Model 
Multihospital System 
Cllaracteristics ------------. 
Member Hospital 
Cllaracteristics -
• 
Locus of Hospital 
strategy-Making 
Achieving this linproved understanding through the development of ex­
planatory models of control over ll'eIllber hospital strategy is the goal 
of this research . 
Analytical Mcx:lel 
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'!he pm:pose of this research is to explain the degree to which and 
the corxtitions under which a hospital ll'eIllber of a MHS controls its own 
strategic decision-making. Cllaracteristics of the MHS itself along 
with characteristics of a hospital ll'eIllber are hypothesized to influence 
whether or not the hospital retains control over its strategy. 
'!he analytical model for the proposed study appears in Figure 1-
'Ihe figure illustrates the influence of both hospital and System-level 
variables upon the control over hospital strategic planning. System-
level detenninants that are considered include its size, ownership, 
geographic dispersion, strategic type , and age. Hospital-level predic-
tors include hospital size, occupancy rate, relationship to the MHS ,  
status as "parent" or "child" hospital , and market area factors . 
Significance 
Specific attention to the functional area of hospital strategic 
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decision-making distinguishes the proposed study from previous work in 
rreasuring overall system decentralization. 'lhese studies falter be­
cause decentralization is a Imllti-dimensional concept. '!he degree of 
decentralization varies deperrling upon the specific type of decision 
which is studied, and decentralization is best analyzed separately for 
each type of decision. Mintzberg (1978) wrote that "selective vertical 
decentralization is logically associated with work constellations 
grouped on a functional basis, " which leads to the conclusion that 
rreasures of overall system decentralization are inappropriate. 
To illustrate, Alexander and Schroer ( 1985) studied the extent of 
decentralization in Imlltihospital systems using an AHA data base . '!hey 
attempted to classify systems by identifying characteristics which were 
associated with relatively higher or lower degrees of overall decen­
tralization. '!hey concluded that "centralization in MRS governance 
defies categorical treatment" and suggested that "centralization must 
be qualified in tenns of specific decisions made at corporate and local 
levels. "  '!hat is precisely what the present research will accomplish. 
COntrol over hospital strategy has been chosen as the functional 
area to investigate since it foms a key point of integration between 
member hospitals and corporate entities. consistent with this posi­
tion, in developing hypotheses about the extent to which hospital mem­
bers of consortia remain autonomous, Provan (1985) chose to look at 
hospital strategy, arguing that a) the ilnpact of MRS involvement was 
strongest there; and b) lower-level decisions were likely to be guided 
by broader decisions, such as hospital strategies . 
A secorrl advantage of the present research over most other MHS 
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studies is that it incorporates hospital-level measures which can 
influence the relationships between hospitals aTXi corporate leaders 
within a MHS .  other studies have relied upon system-level detenninants 
of centralized management within a system, neglecting to incorporate 
infonnation about hospital members or features of their local markets 
(Alexander & Schroer, 1985 ; Provan, 1985 ; Wegrniller, 1985) . By includ­
ing measures of hospital characteristics in the analysis, not only can 
their unique effects upon the MHS-hospital control relationship be 
detennined, but their inportance relative to the inportance of system 
characteristics can be assessed . 
'Ihird, the present study will help to clarify certain MHS research 
findings which appear to be contradictory. For example, Alexander and 
Schroer (1985) showed that not-for-profit systems were the IroSt cen­
tralized in their overall management due largely to their geographic 
concentration, while Kleiner (1984) showed that not-for-profit systems 
were the IroSt decentralized in that local boal:ds and administrators 
were most involved in planning, with relatively little corporate 
influence. In this instance , geographic dispersion appears to interact 
with certain hospital-specific variables , and system OwnerShip has 
ambiguous effects . The current study, by analyzing interactions and by 
carefully controlling other contingencies , can clarify certain appar­
ently contradictory findings which exist in the literature. The influ­
ence of less-obvious or less well-known variables can be observed. 
Finally, the current research is significant in that it will em­
ploy an analytical framework that is comprehensive yet retains its 
direct applicability for managers of both multihospital systems and 
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hospital members of such systems . A contingency perspective leads to 
findings which should assist managers in designing their organizations 
m::>re effectively for strategic decision-making within the system. In­
tegration of new hospital members into systems can be facilitated using 
findings from this study . Moreover, the results of the research will 
be useful for irrleperrlent hospitals in assessing whether or not to join 
a system .  
Lilnitations 
'!he present study will focus upon the nature of the relationship 
between corporate headquarters an:i member hospitals, but will not 
examine the performance ilnplications of variations in the nature of the 
relationship. Prior to investigating the performance effects of con­
trol over hospital strategy, the nature of the relationships must be 
better understood and contingency variables must be clarified. 
'!he empirical analysis will be limited by the size of the MHS 
member sample, and generalizations will be limited by the non-random 
nature of the sample. '!he composition of the sample is biased towards 
inclusion of secular not-far-profit systems .  It is expected that with­
in this population sub:Jroup the most variation in the extent of control 
over a member . hospital ' s  strategy will occur, an:i therefore the bias in 
the sample has distinct advantages. 'lhese data-specific limitations 
will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. 
A final limitation of the study is that it is cross-sectional in 
nature. '!his unfortunately continues to be a general problem in health 
services research . '!he broad range of variables available for inclu­
sion in the analysis somewhat minimizes the effect of static measures . 
OJAPI'ER 2 :  (x)NCEPIUAL FRAME."OORK AND RFSEAROi HYFOIHESES 
'!he purpose of this study is to explain the degree to which am 
the conditions under which hospital members of multihospital systems 
retain strategic decision-making control . In order to do so, ele­
ments of the hospital unit and its envirorunent will be examined 
along with attributes of its multihospital corporate corrponent. For 
detailed explanation of the measures which will be used to represent 
these concepts, the reader is referred to Chapter 3 .  
COntingency Perspective 
'!he analytical model which has been chosen to frame this analy­
sis is known as contingency theory, or the contingency perspective, 
as it will be referred to here. Galbraith (1973 )  has succinctly 
stated the fundamental premises of the approach: a) there is no one 
best way to design an organization; and b) any particular way of 
organizing is not equally effective. An organization will be ll'OSt 
effective when its design is aligned with its strategy, technology, 
size, and envirorunent. '!he appeal of this perspective is the flex­
ible approach with which it addresses the issue of structuring an 
organization, taking into consideration its "context. "  
'!his perspective is especially useful to the current analysis 
for several reasons . First, the perspective postulates that organ­
izational strategy is one of the pr:ill1a:ry contingencies which affect 
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the design of the organization. Contingency theory explicitly 
allows for the analysis of the in'pact of a strategy on the design of 
the organization, arrl vice versa, where other potentially useful 
theoretical mcx:iels do not. 
secorrl, the contingency perspective provides the most compre­
hensive mcx:iel available for framing the analysis . Typical research 
using the contingency perspective employs variables measuring the 
organization I s strategy, envirorunent, size, arrl technology in buil­
ding flexible, adaptable mcx:iels of organizational behavior. It can 
lead to the building of predictive mcx:iels of complex interrelation­
ships, where same of the other potentially useful theories such as 
population theory arrl to some extent the market failures approach 
rely upon post-hoc explanations of the motives arrl behaviors of 
organizations . 
'Ihird, the contingency perspective is preferable to alternative 
theoretical mcx:iels because of the distinctiveness of the health care 
irrlust:ry . Since the health sector is one characterized by regula­
tions, atypical demand by consumers, professional dominance, arrl al­
tered economic incentives due to insurance, market principles often 
do not hold true arrl strictly economic-based theories are sometimes 
inappropriate. SUch is the case with the market-failures or tran­
saction cost approach. 
Fourth, and possibly most ilTIportantly, the concepts can be 
introodiately and readily applied by managers . Where other theories 
often rely upon more abstract notions of the relationships between 
variables , the contingency perspective retains relevance arrl under-
starrlability for practicing administrators . Firrlings can be con-
vetted into practical administrative principles. 
Several important criticisms of the contingency perspective 
have been made in recent years. one of the harshest attacks was 
leveled by SChoonhoven (1981) , when she wrote that 
• • • contingency theory is not a theory at all , in the 
conventional sense of theory as a well-developed set of 
interrelated propositions. It is !lOre an orienting 
strategy or metatheory, suggesting ways in which a 
phenomenon ought to be conceptualized or an approach to 
the phenomenon ought to be explained. • • • Although the 
overall strategy is reasonably clear, the substance of the 
theory is not clear (p. 350) . 
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Tosi and Slocum ( 1984) agreed that the "theory" had some weak 
theoretical concepts, and that much research which was based upon 
contingency theory had not clearly specified relationships or inter­
actions between variables and had problems with the measurement of 
key contingency variables. 
'Ihese criticisms are based upon valid observations of poor 
nodel specification and weak conceptualization. 'Ihe perspective has 
often been utilized as a convenient vehicle with which to test rela-
tionships between certain variables of interest without necessarily 
developing a sound conceptual base . '!he contingency perspective, 
before it can justify its position as a theory, must polish and 
improve the development of its concepts and measures. However, the 
perspective is useful if utilized properly and has numerous aclvan-
tages over other theories . 
'IWo other theoretical approaches warrant further corrparison to 
the contingency perspective in the context of this study. Specifi-
cally, the market failures model arrl resource depen:lence/exchange 
theo� offer potentially legitlinate approaches to this analysis. 
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'!he market failures (also called transaction cost) approach, first 
introduced by Williamson (1975) suffers in this instance because it 
is based upon a corrpetitive economic model , arrl as explained above, 
health care does not operate solely under corrpetitive market assump­
tions. Additionally, according to market failures theo�, the M­
fonn or mul ti -divisional fonn of organization "is non-contingent in 
the sense that it is argued to enhance efficiency arrl , therefore to 
be preferred under all conditions" (pfeffer, 1982 ) . Size is the 
only contingency considered as a factor in the choosing of multi­
divisional fonn for organizations. '!he model is not nearly so broad 
or comprehensive as that of the contingency perspective. 
'!he resource depen:lence or exchange theo� (Aldrich, 1979 ; 
pfeffer arrl Salancick, 1978) is in many instances a well-suited 
approach for research on multihospital systems . since the purpose 
of the current research is to explain the strategic decision-making 
role of hospitals in multihospital systems, the study of depen:lence 
or pcMer relationships between the two organizationS (whiCh is a 
fundamental concept in resource depen:lence theo�) would be appro­
priate. According to this perspective, one organization will have 
pcMer over another to the extent that it can perfonn some function 
which the other organization cannot (Cook, 1981 ;  Provan, 1985) . For 
this research , certain inportant concepts of depen:lence theo� will 
be applied within the contingency framework as variables which in­
fluence the hospital/corporate strategic planning relationship. '!he 
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power held by one entity is ilrportant in its ability to influence 
the control that entity possesses over processes and outcomes within 
an organization (L:in:fulom, 1980) . 
For another reason, though , resource deperrlence theory is less 
applicable to the present research than the contingency perspective. 
Managers are assumed to have a minor role in detennining the stra­
tegy of their organizations according to resource deperrlence theory, 
and the environment takes on the primary role in influencing the 
behavior of organizations. Contingency theory, to reiterate, allows 
one the opportunity to build a �rehensive conceptual model which 
encorrpasses the organization ' s  strategy, environment, technology, 
and size. It is the most flexible and is best suited to a study in 
which the managerial role in detennining the organization ' s  strategy 
takes on primary ilrportance . '!his is where the other perspectives 
fall short. Nevertheless , certain concepts from resource deperrlence 
theory will be linplemented in the contingency framework. 
For this research , contingencies are chosen for examination 
based on their established or hypothesized influence on the extent 
to which hospitals retain control over their strategic planning 
function when they becorre members of a MHS .  Variables relating to 
the strategy, environment, and size of systems and hospitals will be 
examined as they influence the particular decision-making relation­
ship for hospital strategy. 
Contingencies which affect the control of hospital strategic 
planning in MHSs will be examined at two levels of analysis : system 
and hospital . Based upon the literature reviewed below, the follow-
16 
ing characteristics of MHSs have been chosen for analysis : the 
system' s  geographic dispersion, size, ownership, strategy, and age. 
'!he following hospital-level variables are expected to impinge upon 
the hospital-corporate decision-making relationship: the hospital ' s  
occupancy rate, size, status as a "parent" or "child" within the 
MHS ,  fonnal relationship to the MHS ,  and local market corrlitions. 
M..lltihospital System-level Contingencies 
'!his research will examine the impact of chosen system-level 
variables upon the decision-making relationship between an irrli vi­
dual hospital and its corporate headquarters . '!his study is a 
hospital-level analysis, while most of the research on MHSs which 
has been corrlucted previously has addressed system-level factors 
that influence the behavior and perfonnance of MHSs . '!he system­
level factors should impact upon the decision-making relationship 
between the system and each hospital in the MHS ,  in that system­
level measures reflect in part the MHS '  s general policy toward 
strategy-making in its hospitals. only one study in the MHS litera­
ture addressed system-level variables as they impact upon hospitals 
(Kleiner, 1984). It will be necessary for the following discussion 
to draw in relevant organizational literature as well as potentially 
significant health care literature in developing research hypotheses 
about the strategic decision-making relationship between an MHS and 
its hospitals .  
Alexander and Schroer ( 1985), using American Hospital Associa­
tion (AHA) sw:vey data , have studied the issue of decentralization 
in MHSs. All 247 MHSs on the 1983 AHA listing were sw:veyed, and 
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the final sample of 160 systems was biased slightly toward larger 
systems . '!hey measured 15 types of decisions nade in MHSs by either 
hospital or corporate managers, and asked whether hospital or system 
managers had more control over each decision. 
Alexander and Schroer then looked at specific decision areas to 
ascertain the types of decisions over which hospitals were more 
likely to retain control . 'Ihese systems reported, not surprisingly, 
that corporate headquarters retained control over corporate strate­
gic planning functions and system resource allocation. When fonnul­
ation of strategies and long range plans for subordinated hospitals 
was examined , these researchers found that 59% of the systems repor­
ted that the corporate board nade the decisions, while 57%* of the 
systems said that the responsibility resided with the local hospital 
boards . '!hey concluded that "hospital strategic planning exhibits 
wide variation across size, age, and ownership. II 
'!his is the only empirical research to address the issue of the 
locus of hospital strategic decision-making in MHSSi other research 
reports the decentralization of MHS management in general , without 
regard to specific decision areas . ilie to the different'types of 
managerial decisions which must be nade in the management of a MHS , 
there is a need to distinguish unique decision areas and to examine 
corporate and hospital administrative roles as they vary depending 
upon the type of decision urrler consideration. '!he present research 
focuses exclusively upon the hospital strategy decision area . 
'!he sections which follow lead to the development of specific 
* IXles not total 100% since respondents could indicate both corporate 
and local responsibility for a decision area. 
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hypotheses regarding the previously m:mtioned cont:in:Jencies . within 
each set of cont:in:Jency variables, exist:in:J knowledge will be re­
viewed, needs for research will be observed, and finally, hypotheses 
will be presented for test:in:J . 
system Geographic Dispersion 
organizations choose to spread geographically for various 
reasons: growth opportunities, investment, or diversification of 
financial risk to numerous and varied market areas (Ennann and 
Gabel, 1985; Kochen and Deutsch, 1981) . '!he geographic dispersion 
of a MHS is one of the most important concepts relat:in:J to the 
decentralization of strategic decision-naking in a system, in large 
part due to logistical issues. 
Literature on multi-divisional organizations asserts that de­
centralization has many advantages in geographically dispersed or­
ganizations (Kochen and Deutsch, 1981) , primarily because the costs 
of conmmicat:in:J grow with increas:in:J distance between corporate 
headquarters and each division. Feedback time is slower, and head­
quarters has much less day to day awareness of the activi�ies and 
problems faced by each division. Rather than rely:in:J upon the rich, 
personal flavor of infomation about the actions of each division 
which characterizes geographically proximal systems, headquarters 
instead must rely more upon objective measures of perfomance and on 
irrl:irect feedback (Morlock, Alexander, and Hunter, 1985) . 
As geographic dispersion increases, the costliness of maintain­
:in:J an extensive infomation network increases dramatically and 
eventually becomes prohibitive. with growing dispersion, the re-
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liance upon frequent communication with headquarters declines 
because of increasing costs am efforts need  to maintain the 
information flow. Individual hospitals can thus become more auton-
0l00US, am would logically be more likely to have control Oller 
strategic decisions . However, since hospital strategic decisions 
form an essential interface between hospital am corporate strategy, 
the MHS may refuse to yield this decision-making control . 
Another reason that decentralization may be a good management 
policy for geographically dispersed systems sterns from the hetero­
geneity of the local markets in which hospitals in the MHS operate. 
Local markets reflect varying degrees of uncertainty, risk, competi­
tion' am resource munificence am thus uniquely influence the 
behavior of each hospital positioned in that market. To the extent 
that this heterogeneity is greater, as it will be with greater geo­
graphic dispersion, each hospital will have individual goals am 
strategies which may be different from the other hospitals. Corpor­
ate level management of these varied units must take into account 
the strong local market influence. '!his justifies a decentralized 
approach to their management. 
Geographic dispersion has been shown to relate to ownership . 
catholic systems employ the most decentralized management of all the 
systems and are likewise the most geographically dispersed of the 
systems (Alexander and Schroer, 1985; Ernann and Gabel , 1985) . 
'Iheir decentralized management style probably is due to the mission 
of catholic systems (Le. , to fully meet the health care needs of 
the local community) to a larger extent than to geographic disper-
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sion. '!hus catholic system structure supports the hypothesized 
relationships. Not-for-profit systems, in contrast, are the least 
dispersed of all cr.vnership types am have the most centralized 
management structure, a firrling which also supports the geographic 
dispersion hypothesis (Alexarrler am Schroer, 1985: Ennann am 
Gabel, 1985) . 
Finally, in an unpublished work, Alexarrler (1985) fourrl that 
geographic dispersion was negatively related to corporate control of 
decision-l1Iakin:J in all decision areas that he investigated, inclu­
ding hospital strategic plannin:]. He argued that hospitals were 
traditionally established as irrleperrlent, professional bureaucracies 
and that systems likewise were loose confederations, already predis­
posed toward decentralized structures . 
While geographic dispersion lerrls itself to decentralized man­
agement, geographic concentration is associated with centralized 
management. While dispersed systems incur greater costs to communi­
cate and do so at a slower rate, local systems can exchange rich 
infonnation quickly and with very little effort in most cases . For 
these reasons, it is logical to develop centralized management 
structures so that the activities of system hospitals are coordin­
ated. 
Reynolds and Stunden (1978) published some observational data 
about a small group of not-for-profit MHSs. '!he extent to which a 
geographically concentrated system controls its local market influ­
ences the degree to which management of the MHS should be central­
ized , according to their observations. Reynolds and Stunden obser-
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ved that the geographically cxmcentrated system with a lOClnopoly on 
the local market has the greatest opportunity for deriving benefits 
from economies of scale an::l efficient deployment of resources . '!hey 
observed an::l hence recommend a highly centralized structure for 
these systems .  
Geographically concentrated systems where member hospitals face 
a high degree of corrpetition tenj to be somewhat centralized in 
their management in order to balance the needs of individual hospi­
tals with the corporate perspective. In contrast to the lOClnopolist 
systems, hospitals in these systems must Il'aintain some decision­
making control an::l thus are not as strongly centralized (Reynolds 
an::l Sturrien, 1978) . 
Research Needs 
'!he relationship between geographic dispersion an::l decentral­
ization is quite well accepted, especially in the business litera­
ture . It needs additional replication an::l confinnation for MHS 
literature. Effects due to ownership an::l size must be separated 
from those due to dispersion. OVerall system-level dispersion will 
cause the MHS to develop a general policy of decentralization or of 
centralization towards strategy-making in its hospitals . In which 
instances an::l whether this corporate policy overrides other factors 
which affect the strategic decision-making control for hospitals 
needs further investigation. 
Existing research addresses the decentralization issue as a 
general category, despite the fact that recent research has demon­
strated that the management structure differs for different tunc-
tiona! decision areas . Specific attention nnlSt be given to the 
decision regarding decentralization of hospital strategy making .  
Research Hypotheses 
HI : Hospitals in geographically dispersed systems will control 
their own strategic planning to a greater extent than will 
hospitals in geographically concentrated systems. 
System Size 
22 
The focus of the present research is on small multihospital 
systems, with size defined by the number of hospitals in the system, 
for reasons given in O1apter 1 .  '!here is variety within this 
"small" (two to seven hospitals) catego:ry: hospitals belonging to a 
MHS with two hospitals will have different interactions with col:pOr­
ate headquarters than will hospitals that belong to systems of six 
or seven hospitals . 
Most of the research conducted on MHSs has considered the 
behavior and perfonnance of the largest MHSs , and there is a resul­
ting lack of information available on the implications of size for 
the smaller organizations. Likewise, business literature has ex­
plored overall decentralization of management in divisionalized 
fonus of organizations, but until recently has virtually ignored the 
link between the strategy of the business unit and decentralization 
of control to the unit (Govindarajan, 1986) . 
At the system level of analysis, there are some \olell-estab-
lished findings from organization theo:ry which are relevant. In 
general , as the size of an organization increases , the organization 
becomes more bureaucratic, has greater specialization within units, 
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rrore fonnalization, a higher administrative/ staff ratio, and impor­
tantly for this work, greater decentralization of decision-making 
control to subunits of the organization (Daft, 1985; Pfeffer, 1982 ) . 
As was the case for geographic dispersion, ''with increases in 
size, both financial costs of control and distortions in communica­
tion required for control are likely to increase" (Mcx::h and Morse, 
1977 ) . At some point top management is compelled to delegate some 
decision-making control to lower levels in order to maintain overall 
control . 
Although the size of an organization can be expected to have 
much the sane influence that it does in non-health care division­
alized finns , the effect of size must be examined with particular 
attention to the distinctive incentives which operate in the health 
care irrlustry. Bureaucracy, fonnalization, and standardization are 
characteristics that are less typical of hospitals and hospital 
systems because of the nature of health care delivery. '!be notion 
of increasing fonnalization and standardization as size increases 
may apply more to a hospital itself than to a system of hospitals .  
Increasing decentralization with increasing size, . hdvever, is 
one relationship which seems to be in accordance with the behavior 
of MHSs and has been demonstrated by several investigators . Most 
recently, Alexarrler and Schroer ( 1985) , in research described in the 
previous section, looked at 15 decisions made by MHS hospital and 
corporate leaders . Table 2 shows the results of analysis of var­
iance tests on the relationships between size and decentralization 
of decisions made within hospital systems . '!hey found that overall, 
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Table 2 
OVerall Locus of Decision-making Authority, by System Size 
Decisions Made Decisions Made Decisions Shared 
Exclusively by Exclusively by Corporate and 
Corporate Board Local Board Local Boards 
SVstem size (% of decisions)9 (% of decisions) ( % of decisions) 
2 hospitals 55% 16% 11% 
3-9 hospitals 48 17 20 
lOt hospitals 36 17 25 
Allsystems 47 17 19 
Results of 1 , 3 not 1 , 3 
test of mean significant significant significant 
differencesl2 
a Responses do not total 100% since resporrlents could irxlicate more 
than one group having responsibility for a decision. 
b p<.05 
Source : Alexan::ler and Schroer, 1985 
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the larger systems had significantly more decentralization than did the 
smaller systems in their sarrple. Specifically addressing the issue of 
strategic decisions for the hospital units of the MHSs, hospitals in 
larger MHSs had more control Oller their strategic planning than did 
hospitals in medium or small systems. 
'!hese results are helpful in the general sense, but fall short in 
several ways . First, the broad grouping of the medium-sized systems 
may mask soma less noticeable but still linportant differences between 
them. '!he management of a MHS with nine hospitals differs quite sub­
stantially from that of a MHS with three hospitals . 
Secon:i, the sarrple from which these results were drawn was biased 
toward medium an:i large systems, un:ier-representing very small systems . 
Fifty-five percent of respon:ients were in systems with four or more 
hospitals , while only 35% of non-respondents fell into this category. 
one could conclude that the results may not be generalizable to MHSs 
having two or three hospitals.  
Based on a literature review on consortium MHSs, Provan (1985) 
developed (but did not test) soma hypotheses about the autonomy of 
hospitals within such consortia. With regard to size, he" postulated 
that larger consortia would be associated with a more diverse set of 
hospitals ,  or greater heterogeneity. '!his diversity, coupled with the 
greater rnnnber of units with which to interact, would allow less auto­
nomy for individual hospitals within the consortia. '!he relevance of 
Provan ' s  research is that hospitals in larger MHSs should have less 
autonomy, or less decentralization of decision-making . 
Provan' s reasoning directly contradicts the findings of Alexander 
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and SChroer (1985) and the expectations generated by an examination of 
the organizational literature on decentralization and size. His hypo-
theses appear logical and must be examined further. It is possible 
that there is a range of size where his concepts hold true. 
Research Needs 
Organizational literature derronstrates a clear link between in-
creasing size and increasing decentralization of decision-makin:J to 
subunits . '!his concept is poorly understood in the health care field 
and especially in the MHS literature. MHSs are not typical finns : in 
nany cases, hospitals are loosely coupled to the corporate entity and 
therefore findings which have bee."1 derronstrated for divisionalized 
finns may not apply. 
'!he effect of firm size on the locus of hospital strategic deci­
sion-makin:J control has not been researched. studies have looked at 
the relationship between size and the general level of decentralization 
in an organization, but the specific functional area of strategy has 
not been studied in MHS literature. 
Research Hypotheses 
Hospitals which belong to larger MHSs will control their own 
strategy-making nore than will hospitals in smaller MHSs. 
system OWnership 
Differences in MHSs due to ownership is a frequently studied 
topic. Wib'1 regard to geographic dispersion, regiOnal location, stra-
tegy, size, and mission, differences due to ownership have been docu-
mented to some extent (Ermann and Gabel, 1985 ; Fottler, Schennemorn, 
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Wong, and Money, 1982 ; Illke and Begun, 1986 ; Zuckennan, 1981) . other 
differences, such as those relating to management structures, have been 
hypothesized but not well supported. Despite the inpJrtance of this 
issue, there has been relatively little research on the effect of own­
ership on the types or curount of activities over which a hospital in a 
MHS retains control . D::x:::umented infonnation about the differences in 
the curount of decentralization depending on ownership warrants the in­
clusion of ownership as a contingency variable in the present research . 
In investigating the role of the hospital administrator, Kleiner 
( 1984) interviewed the executives of 29 hospitals which belonged to 
large investor-owned or not-far-profit MHSs. He asked the question, 
"Is there corporate guidance that inpacts on your responsibility for 
activity?" . Relating to hospital strategic planning, their responses 
indicated that not-far-profit systems had much ll'Ore local board in­
volvement in their planning activities as opposed to system-level 
corporate involvement. Investor-owned systems had much ll'Ore involve­
ment of the corporate staff in the fonnulation of strategy and the 
development of long range plans and objectives in system hospitals 
(Kleiner, 1984) . 
AlexarXler and Schroer (1985) asked MHS executives whether a list 
of 15 types of decisions were made by the hospital board, corporate 
board; or by both . Table 3 shows the responses made by leaders of 
organizations of each type of ownership. Voluntary not-far-profit and 
public systems were by far the least decentralized overall , with 58% of 
decisions being made solely at the corporate level and only 10% of 
decisions made solely at the hospital level . Religious and catholic 
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Table 3 
OVerall Locus of Decision Authority, by System CMnership 
Decisions made Decisions made Decisions shared 
Exclusively by Exclusively by Corporate arrl 
Corporate Board Local Board Local Boards 
CMnership (% of decisions)g (% of decisions) (% of decisions) 
catholic 41% 25% 26% 
Religious (other) 29 18 34 
Voluntary/Public 58 10 12 
Investor owned 30 18 10 
All systems 47 17 19 
Results of 1&3, 2&3, 4&3 1&3 1&3 ,2&3 ,1&4 , 2&4 
test of mean significant significant significant 
differencesb 
a Responses do not total 100% since respondents could indicate more 
than one group having responsibility for a decision. 
b p<.05 
Source: Alexander and Schroer, 1985 
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systems ranked the highest in the percentage of shared decisions, 
arxi catholic systems had the highest percentage of decisions which 
were made locally by hospitals. Investor-owned along with not-for­
profit MHSs had lower rates of shared decision-making. Investor­
owned systems appear to divide up the decision areas arxi allocate 
them to either local or corporate decision makers ,  while not-for­
profit systems give corporate control to more decisions. 
It is highly possible that the ownership differences fourrl by 
Alexarrler arxi Schroer were due to the overall geographic dispersion 
of the system. Not-for-profit systems are for the most part geo­
graphically concentrated, while catholic systems are more conunonly 
located at some distance apart. Control over the effects of geo­
graphic dispersion could be helpful in detennining the true rela­
tionship between ownership arxi control of hospital strategic 
decisions. 
Alexarrler arxi Schroer ( 1985) addressed the control issues in 
the aggregate but did not report ownership differences for each 
specific type of decision. 'lherefore, which entity has control over 
the strategic plans of the hospital was not studied in this 
research . 
Another difficulty in the Alexarrler-Schroer study was the 
grouping of vollUltal:y not-for-profit hospitals with vollUltal:y public 
hospitals .  Public hospitals arxi hospital systems, because they are 
accotmtable to a state government, have different managerial arxi 
structural relationships with their higher authorities than do vol­
lUltal:y not-for-profit hospitals. 'lhus the effect of MHS ownership 
with regard to not for profit systems may not be accurate in the 
Alexarx:ler am SChroer study . 
Research Needs 
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The results of the work of IG.einer ( 1984) am Alexarx:ler am 
Schroer ( 1985) contradict, showing opposite ownership effects. 
IG.einer asserted that not-far-profit hospitals were lOOre decentral­
ized, while Alexarxler am SChroer indicated their centralized man­
agement. 'Ihis contradiction may be due to measurement, sampling, or 
grouping differences between the two studies. The tnle effect of 
ownership on control of strategic planning for system hospitals must 
be clarified using clearer measures am better-defined control 
variables to eliminate spurious differences . 
Again, the general issue of decentralization of MHS decision­
making has been addressed by Alexarxler am Schroer, but further 
follow up on the specific decision areas, i . e. , strategic planning 
for hospitals, has been researched in only one non-experirrental 
survey with inconclusive findings (IG.einer, 1984 ) . As mentioned 
previously, research on MHSs has been limited to attention to the 
MHS level of analysis , without enphasis upon the relationship 
between MHS headquarters am individual hospitals am variables that 
influence it. 
Finally, the reported research relating to decentralization in 
MHSs has been drawn alIOOst exclusively from American Hospital 
Association data which were obtained in the late 1970 ' s . More 
current measures are needed with the influence of prospective 
payment incentives now at work in the health care industry. 
31  
Research Hyootheses 
Not-for-profit MHSs will be no different from other ownership 
categories on the amount of strategic decision-making control 
held by hospitals. 
System strategy 
'!he study of business arrl corporate strategy was popular during 
the 1960 ' s  arrl 70 ' s ,  with Olarrller (1962) bringing initial attention 
to the concept. By close observation of a large number of Fortune 
500 corporations, he developed a logical sequence of corporate 
strategies which led to particular corporate structures . He noted 
that strategies for growth in finns followed three basic patterns: 
extensions of existing products to new markets, extensions of new 
products to existing markets, or extensions of new products arrl new 
markets (diversification) . He observed that with growth in 
corrplexity brought on by the third strategy, diversification, finns 
took on different structures than did finns which grew by extending 
existing products or markets, which increased in size. A result of 
this fcnrous work was the well acx::epted principle that "structure 
follows strategy. " 
Specifically, Olarrller identified two distinct structures of 
these finns : functional arrl divisional . Functional structures, in 
which finns are divided along the lines of the functions perfonned 
by each department, are associated with strategies of size expansion 
(expansion of existing products or markets) . Divisional structures , 
where finns are divided according to products, with COITpOnents of 
each function operating at each product division, were observed with 
associated strategies of diversification. 
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since Olandler ' s  landmark work, numerous other researchers have 
developed related theories of strategies for growth in organizations 
(Rurnelt, 1974 ; scott, 1973 ) . Rl.lrnP-1t (1974) documented the growth in 
divisional fonns in the corporate sector, relating to the need for 
decentralized management which acx::onpmies diversity. All of these 
versions of <llarrller '  s original model shared in conunon the notion 
that a certain structure will enable a finn to "fit" well with its 
enviro�t (Miles, 1982) . '!he choice of a particular internal 
design sought to channel the organization ' s  competencies am 
resources along a chosen strategy. This concept was explained by 
Robert Miles (1982) : 
organizational effectiveness is largely a function of top 
management ' s  ability to create am maintain congruence 
am:>n;J the factors of the enviro� am of organizational 
strategy, structure, am competence . 
'!he study of strategy in the health care industry has lagged 
behirrl research in corporate strategy, largely because there was 
little need for hospital strategy or product positioning under cost-
based reimbursement incentives. Recently, however, the health care 
irrlustry has seen the advent of al ternati ve fonns of service 
delivery am altered economic incentives, leading to competition am 
uncertainty. strategic plarming has becorre essential . Luke am 
Kurowski (1983)  stated that the late 1970 ' s  began the "early strate­
gic phase" of evolution of the hospital industry am that continued 
emphasis on strategy is likely. 
Because of the newness of the application of business strategic 
principles in health care, a large literature on it has not evolved. 
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Little work has focused on the strategic planning of hospitals and 
the influence of MHS lreI!1bership. It is expected that the strategy 
pursued by a MHS will influence its design or structure. As a MHS 
grows beyorrl a certain point, it should becarre decentralized in its 
management design. However, MHSs begin at a fairly high level of 
decentralization compared to business finns , due to the nature of 
the delivery of health care services within a community. A MHS 
typically has looser linkages than those which characterize the link 
between a division with its cOl:porate headquarters in a finn from 
another irrlustry. 
One work has addressed the issue of strategy in MHSs . Luke and 
Begun ( 1986) applied the strategic typology developed by Miles and 
Snow (1978) to action orientations taken by small MHSs . Although 
the work did not examine the relationship between the structure and 
strategy of the organizations, the testing and validation of the 
typology is relevant since system strategy will be used as a variab­
le in this research . 
Miles and SncM (1978) developed a typology of the action orien-
tations or strategies chosen by organizations based upon their "ag-
gressiveness or willingness to � risk in pursu.in;J a chosen 
growth strategy. " '!hey identified four patterns of strategic behav­
ior which typified an organization over a long period of time . 
Prospectors are the most aggressive of finns , possessing a 
flexible structure which allows them to be the leaders in the 
pursuit of new products and new markets . 
Defenders seek stability and efficiency as they develop the 
products or markets which they have chosen. 
Analyzers represent a combination of prospectors and defenders , 
as they combine flexibility and control in analyzing new 
opportunities. 
Reactors are the least effective types of organizations, 
possessing an inconsistent strate:Jy of adapting to the 
envirornnent. 
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lllke and Beglm (1986) classified systems according to the 
typology by examining the aggressiveness with which systems urrler-
took acquisitions, using two dimensions of acquisitive actions: the 
percentage of hospitals acquired since 1975 and the overall number 
of hospitals acquired through early 1985 . 'Ihese measures were 
asstnned to measure overall aggressiveness in the marketplace. 
"Prospectors" were defined as having a high percentage of hospitals 
acquired since 1975 , along with a medium to high number of hospitals 
acquired. '!his typology was deIronstrated to be valid for small 
multihospital systems by lllke and Beglm (1986) . 
Research Needs 
While this research will make use of the strategic typology 
described above to classify the small MHSs urrler investigation, 
there is no research to guide the generation of hypotheses relating 
to the influence of MHS strate:Jy upon the locus of strategic deci­
sion-making for the hospitals belonging to a system. Clearly there 
is a need to detennine whether or not the strate:Jy chosen by a MHS 
has any influence in the control of the strategies of rneI'[lber hospit­
als . 'Ihere is a void in knowledge relating to the relationship 
between MHS strate:Jy and the organizational design it chooses , spec­
ifically relating to decentralization. Since MHSs typically have 
loose coupling of interorganizational relationships, they must be 
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assumed to be different from other divisionalized fims not in the 
health care industry. Different principles may hold true for the 
study of strategy and design in MHSs . 
Because prospectors create flexible organizations designed to 
be able to move quickly into promising product or market areas ,  it 
is expected that in order to retain this flexibility they llUlSt be 
closely in tune to the local market. In contrast, deferrlers, seek-
ing efficiency, would not need to be as externally focused as they 
instead fine-tune their technologies to create rnax.imum efficiency. 
Analyzers develop some of each quality. 
Because of their goals to move quickly in local markets , pros­
pector systems are expected to offer their hospitals ll'Ore autonomy 
to move in the local market, thus allowing for aggressive posturing. 
Research Hypotheses 
Hospitals belonging to systems characterized as prospectors 
will have IlPre control Oller their strategies than deferrlers ,  
analyzers, or reactors. 
System Age 
'!he final system level variable which should affect the deci­
sian-making relationship between the system and the hospital for 
hospital strategy is that of the age of the system, measured by the 
length of time that the MHS has been incorporated. As a finn ages 
it moves through different stages of development in which organiza­
tional needs and goals differ. It implements different foms of 
management in order to accomplish these goals . Management styles 
and policies may change with the experience gained from a time 
pericxl of involvement in a MRS .  Table 4 illustrates . 
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For newly fonned systems, coordination across hospitals is 
pararrount as mechanisms are created to coordinate activities and 
define the corporate and hospital roles as they are to exist. 
Concerns at this time are the corporate mission, goals , and aut­
hority and how they will interface with the mission, goals, ani 
authority of each member hospital . A balance of power nrust be 
established between each hospital andcorporate headquarters con­
cerning the decision-making about actions taken by hospitals . Bar­
rett (1979) calls this pericxl the building and establishing stage 
and adds that defining a decision-making process is a primary activ­
ity during the system ' s  inception. Power struggles are likely to 
ensue if corporate leaders assume too much control over decisions, 
especially in not-for-profit facilities with traditions of strong 
local hospital board control , who nrust shift to corporate system 
governance structures (Alexarrler and Schroer, 1985) . 
Two studies have shown similar levels of corporate control in 
young systems . Money, Gillifan, & £)mean (1976) , in their SUl:Vey of 
16 hospital systems , observed that younger hospital systeins were 
more fonnalized and authority was stronger at the corporate level , 
since coordination across hospitals was essential during the early 
growth pericxl. In an unpublished study of 160 MRSs, Alexarrler 
(1985) found that younger systems were more centralized in their 
strategic planning structures for member hospitals .  In contrast, 
middle-aged systems were the most decentralized of all : the largest 
percentage of decisions were left for hospital themselves to make. 
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Table 4 
MHS Development OVer Tilre and 
Implications for Decentralization of Hospital strategy 
Age 
Early Years 
(Fonnative 
Systems) 
Activities 
-developing coordinating mech­
anisms across hospitals 
-establishing mission, struc­
ture, roles, processes of MHS 
-arranging shared activities 
Middle Years -solidifying interaction pat­
(Solidifying terns between hospitals 
Systems) -elaborating and expanling 
later Years 
(Advanced 
Systems) 
shared activities 
-bureaucratizing system con­
trol structures 
-adjusting to growing size 
(depending on strategy) 
-increasing specialization by 
component units of system 
Decentralization Issues 
-nanagement of c:orrpeting 
interests of system mem­
bers suggests decentral . 
-central control neces­
sary to inplement unified 
corporate strategy 
-degree of decentraliza­
tion deperrls largely 
on other variables like 
size, strategy, dispersion 
-decentralization favored 
with growing size 
-decentralization deperrls 
largely on other var­
iables like size, disper­
sion, strategy 
(Adapted from Barrett, 1979 ; Starkweather, 1981 ; Wegrniller, 1985) 
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After a system has lOOVed successfully through the early processes 
of establishing the system, new issues arise concerning solidifying the 
arrangements which have been made, further defining arrl :ilrplementing 
integration arOCll1g hospitals,  elaborating arrl expanding shared services , 
an:i evaluating the perfonnance so far of the whole system (Barrett, 
1979 ; Wegmiller, 1985) . Now, the arramt of decentralization which is 
appropriate is contingent largely upon the aggressiveness or expansive­
ness of the strategy chosen by the MHS an:i upon other variables such as 
its size or geographic dispersion. Hospital managers may be more free 
to decide upon strategies for their hospitals during this stage if they 
work within the bounds set up by early definition of corporate mission, 
strategy, an:i the like. 
Concerns are similar for MHSs which have been in existence for 
many years . In systems , hospitals must cope with the increased bureau­
cratization of corporate controls.  Money, et al .  ( 1976) reported that 
the older systems which they studied were in fact less fonnalized arrl 
more decentralized, with more authority residing at the hospital level 
relative to the younger systems . Executives in the older systems in 
their study evidently felt that their hospital could better cope with 
the uncertainties in their enviromnents by making their own decisions . 
'Ibis research did not specifically address strategic decisions for 
hospitals . 
In contrast, Alexander, in unpublished research ( 1985) , showed 
that hospitals in older MHSs had less control over strategic decisions 
than did hospitals in middle aged MHSs . Alexander sunnised that the 
growth periods of MHS development required more central system control , 
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am that older systems could be redirecting or consolidating growth 
using centralized management. Older hospital systems have had oppor­
tunities to experiment with various structural arrangements am deci­
sion-making relationships am then to decide which elements to retain 
am which to discard in the operating of a MHS .  For mature MHS , either 
decentralization or centralization of corporate control may be warran­
ted, depending upon other contingency variables at work within a sys­
tem, such as strategy, size am geographic dispersion. 
Research Needs 
While several studies have explored the stages of growth of MHSs 
am ill1plications for decentralized management, no consensus has been 
reached about the unique effects of system age with other interacting 
variables held constant. COnflicting results have been obtained, 
especially in older systems . It is unlikely that the present research 
will completely fill this gap in the literature, since its sample will 
be restricted to smaller MHSs which are most likely in the early to 
middle stage of growth. However some light can be shed upon nore 
youthful systens . 
Secondly, once again the attention of researchers to date has been 
on the aggregate level of decentralization in nn.1ltihospital systems and 
has not turned to the relationships between hospitals ani corporate 
headquarters . Much infonnation about intra-system differences may have 
been lost in the aggregation to the system level of analysis . 
'Ihird, the specific decision area relating to hospital strategy­
making has not been examined as it relates to decentralized corporate 
control . It has been documented that the level of decentralization 
within a system differs deperrling upon the particular decision area 
urxier scrutiny, and therefore overall generalizations based upon ag­
gregate system level data are inappropriate. A separate focus on the 
decentralization of hospital strategic decision-makin;J must be 
urxiertaken. 
Research HyPotheses 
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Hospitals belonging to younger systens will have less control over 
their strategy-making than hospitals in IrOre rrature systens . 
Hospital-level Contingencies 
A fundamental premise in this research is that the locus of hos-
pital strategic decision-making control differs for each hospital 
within a system-each hospital has a unique relationship with system 
headquarters which is based largely upon distinct features of the hos­
pital and its local market. It is this perspective which will allow 
the present study to contribute significantly to the currently sparse 
literature concerning the relationships between system headquarters and 
rrember hospitals . 
Published research to date presents infonnation � hospi­
tal/corporate decision-making relationships aggregated over entire 
systems , ignoring inherent differences between subunits belonging to 
the MHS which can alter these relationshiI'S. For example, as discussed 
in the section on MHS-level contingencies above, Alexarrler (with 
others) has extensively explored decentralization of system rranagement, 
looking at specific types of decisions and who makes them within dif­
ferent kirrls of systems . He then reports certain levels of decentral-
ization for these systems . When decentralization is aggregated for 
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an entire system arrl examined at that level , irxlividual differences 
in relationships between hospitals arrl corporate headquarters are 
rnasks:l . Alexander has repeatedly stated in the discussion sections 
of his papers that the issues he describes are complex arrl in need 
of further clarification. '!he notion that characteristics of a 
hospital can affect whether or not the hospital chooses its own 
strategies has largely been ignored in the literature. 
Based upon inferences from organizational theory, arrl to a les­
ser extent upon published research in health care, the hospital at­
tributes listed below have been selected for inclusion in the pre­
sent study. '!he following hospital characteristics are hypothesized 
to affect whether or not a hospital retains control over its strate­
gic planning within a MHS :  its occupancy, its size, whether it is a 
"parent" hospital , the nature of its relationship to the MHS ( L e . , 
owned , leased, or managed) , arrl features of its local market. 
Hospital Ocx::upancy Rate 
Hospitals become members of MHSs for a variety of reasons , such 
as to diversify service mix , to gain market share , or to linprove the 
delivery of health services in the community. In the majority of 
instances ,  hospitals become members of MHSs due to their financial 
distress (Mark, 1984 ; Starkweather, 1981) . "Both for-profit arrl 
nonprofit systems have grown largely through the acquisition of fin­
ancially troubled irrlepenjent hospitals" (Ennann arrl Gabel , 1984 ) . 
One source of financial trouble is a low occupancy rate. For these 
hospitals,  the major benefits to involvement in a hospital corpora­
tion are the access to financial resources along with managerial 
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expertise it can provide. 
According to this perspective one could logically conclude that 
the worse the occupancy rate of a hospital belonging to a MHS , the 
IOOre dependent the hospital will be upon the corporate system for 
financial arrl managerial support. Resource flows that are always in 
one direction result in power for the giver arrl dependence for the 
receiver (Lehman, 1975) . '!he extent to which a hospital depends 
upon these corporate resources for viability plays a large part in 
detennining the locus of control Oller decision-making within a 
system. 
'!his applies to the making of strategic decisions for hospi­
tals . "'Ihe IOOre power an organization (e.g. , MHS ) has , the IOOre 
influence it has to detennine the nature of the interorganizational 
exchange; Le. , to detennine the fom of the interaction • • . " 
(Cook, 1977) . Specifically, the IOOre power that one entity has , the 
IOOre it can control decision-making processes within the organiza­
tion. Provan (1985) supported this reasoning in his paper when he 
hypothesized that "the greater dependence of a hospital on its con­
sortitnn, the greater the liklihood that the hospital ' s  gerieral 
strategic-level decisions will be influenced by the consortitnn. "  
Research Needs 
No empirical research could be found to support or refute this 
line of reasoning specifically regarding hospital strategy making in 
MHSs .  'lhus the current study should provide insight into this rela­
tively unexplored area . 
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Research Hypotheses 
Hospitals with lCMer occupancy rates will have less control 
over their strategic plannin;J than will hospitals with higher 
occupancy rates. 
Hospital Size 
'!he concept of hospital size nrust be viewed from two perspec­
tives for the development of hypotheses about the hospital strategic 
plannin;J relationship in MHSs . First, the absolute size of the 
focal hospital , measured by the rnnnber of beds, nrust be considered 
due to its inplications for access to human arrl financial resources 
in the organization. Secorxi, hospital bedsize relative to the 
bedsize of the entire system nrust be examined because of its expec­
ted influence on power in the relationship between a hospital arrl 
its corporate headquarters. 
larger organizations in general have more discretionary re­
sources which they are able to divert from one unit to another when 
necessary when input fluctuations occur (Kimberly, 1976) . In 
contrast, small hospitals have fewer options from which to divert 
resources in order to cover a shortfall in a certain area.. '!hus , it 
follows that a small facility would be more dependent upon corporate 
headquarters to srrooth the fluctuations in resource inputs to the 
hospital than would a large hospital . A small hospital would have 
less control over its CMn decisions about strategy the more it had 
to rely upon its corporation for resources . 
Additionally, as the size of an organization grows , so does its 
complexity arrl range of functioning. "large organizations . . .  engage 
in more activities, leaving them less at the mercy of destructive 
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forces working on one localized segment" (Starkweather, 1981) . '!he 
greater ability to be self-sufficient in corrlucting these various 
functions provides large hospitals with a greater degree of autonomy 
in corrparison to small facilities. A small hospital is likely to be 
m::>re depenjent upon system managers to perfonn functions which it 
cannot . Marketing is one functional area which can illustrate this 
difference. A large hospital may employ a staff to corrluct regular 
marketing campaigns, whereas a small hospital may rely upon an 
assistant administrator to perfonn the same function. '!his smaller 
hospital may be lOOre dependent than the large hospital upon system 
headquarters for marketing activities. '!he MHS would therefore be 
in a position to have greater control Oller decisions relating to 
marketing in the hospital . 
When the size of a hospital is considered with regard to the 
proportion of MHS beds it controls,  predicted relationships among 
the variables change. To illustrate, a hospital defined as small in 
absolute teJ:1ns may actually control lOOre than half of its system ' s  
beds if it belongs to a two-hospital system c:orrposed of two small 
facilities. 
Resource dependence theory offers one explanation of how the 
corporate carcponent of a MHS could become dependent upon a hospital 
in the system anj therefore yield decision-making control to the 
hospital . '!his is an important concept, especially when working 
with small MHSs . '!he greater the proportion of system hospital beds 
controlled by a hospital , the lOOre importance that hospital holds in 
the OIIerall perfornance of the system. Provan (1985) hypothesized 
that the in'portance of a hospital to its a::msortimn increases with 
greater relative size. '!his in'portance to the system translates 
into greater power for a relatively larger hospital to participate 
in decisions affecting it, including its strategy. Again, this 
45 
increased power translates into greater OPIX>rtunity for control over 
decisions . 
Research Needs 
The relationship of hospital size to its control over its own 
strategy within a multihospital system has not been reIX>rted in the 
literature. 
Research Hypotheses 
H8 : 
Hospitals with larger absolute bedsize will control their stra­
tegic planning to a greater extent than hospitals with srraller 
absolute bedsize. 
Hospitals with a larger proportion of system beds will have 
nore control over their strategic decision-making than 
hospitals with a srraller proportion of system beds . 
Parent Hospitals 
Because the present study deals exclusively with srrall hospital 
systems, a specific issue must be addressed which would not neces-
sarily hold true for the study of large MHSs . In srrall hospital 
systems , the rn.nnber of IX>tentially divergent viewpoints is limited, 
thus the influence of each hospital should be stronger in the gover-
nance of the srrall system. In large systems , the larger number of 
hospitals should increasingly dilute the influence of any irrlividual 
hospital in the system. 
Whether or not a hospital was an originating member of the 
small MHS plays a large part in detennining the ability it has to 
corrluct its business under the corporate tnnbrella. By definition, 
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it has been a meJtlber of the system longer than any other hospital in 
the system. 
'!he "parent" hospital was first described by lllke an:i Begun 
( 1986) in developing their local market m:ldel of MHS strategy: 
• • •  the concept of a 'parent '  hospital . • •  iIrplies that 
one hospital initiated the system growth an:i that that 
hospital exercises dominance an:i control over smaller 
family meJtlbers. 
In 1lPSt instances, corporate leaders come from the ranks of parent 
hospital executives an:i corporate offices are physically located at 
the parent facility. Parents are typically large, successful hos-
pitals (lllke an:i Begun, 1986) . 
'!his distinction between a parent an:i a "child" hospital has 
iIrplications for how decisions are made about hospitals within the 
MHS :  it pervades all corporate-hospital interactions, including 
that of strategic planning for each hospital . Relative to parent 
hospitals,  child hospitals would be expected to control their stra-
tegic decisions to a much lesser extent, due to the dominance of the 
parent. 
Research Needs 
'!he theoty of parent hospitals within MHSs is newly developed 
an:i untested. It is particularly relevant for work dealing with the 
managem:mt an:i growth in small MHSs . 
Research Hypotheses 
Hg :  Parent hospitals will have more control over their strategy­
making than hospitals which are not parents . 
'lYpe of Hospi tal-MHS Relationship 
Kleiner ( 1984 ) pointed to a need for further research in the 
differences in management styles for owned , leased, or contrac,t­
managed facilities. His interviews with 42 administrators in 11 
hospital systems inconclusively suggested differences between 
administrators in contract-managed vs . owned hospitals within the 
SlalOO systems . Differences in these organizational relationships 
will detennine intangible factors such as the importance of the 
position held by a hospital in the corporate portfolio or in the 
mirrls of MHS strategists. 
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Fottler, Schennerhorn, Wong, & Money ( 1982 ) conceived of these 
relationships as a contirnrum which reflected the degree of coxmnit­
ment of a hospital to a MHS . Fottier et al .  identified certain 
variables am postulated the level of coxmnitment present urrler dif­
ferent organizational relationships (Le. , owned , leased, contract 
managed in this instance) . Table 5 presents the proposed coxmnitment 
levels urrler each of these relationships. '!he importance of the 
differences by type of cammitment shown in Table 5 are that they 
irrlicate varying approaches to management of a hospital based. upon 
its relationship to the MHS . 
Aldrich (1979) described the notion of coxmnitment as "inten­
sity" , or the curount of investment an organization has in its rel­
ations with other organizations. '!his intensity stenuned from two 
sub-c:orcponents: the curount of resources involved, L e . , money, num­
ber of services, number of people provided to the other organiza­
tion; am the frequency of the interaction with the other organiza-
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Table 5 
Hospital Conunit:ment to MHS by Management catego� 
Hospital Relationship to MHS Selected Managerial 
Variables 0Wne:i Leased Contract Managed 
Institutional Autonomy 
Resource Conunit:ment 
Influence on Policy 
none same 
same 
yes same 
source: Fottier, et al . (1982) 
some 
little 
same 
tion. Aldrich shewed that relationships ani interactions were 
likely to be different deperxting upon this intensity. 
Research Needs 
One organization ' s  level of cammit:ment to another has distinc­
tive inplications for various nanagerial processes , including hos-
pital strategic planning, which was not specifically addressed. 
Research specifically relating to differences in the hospital­
col:pOrate strategic planning relationship has not appeare:i in the 
literature. 
Research Hypotheses 
A hospital that is invo1ve:i in extensively cammitted relation­
ship with the MHS (Le. , owne:i by the MHS) , will have less 
control over its strategy relative to those hospitals in less 
cammitted relationships (Le. , leased or contract nanage:i) . 
Number of COmpeting Hospital Beds 
Like the hospitals themselves, the features of hospital market 
areas will � in a MHS with regard to the incentives or uncertain­
ties which they can create for Wividual units of the system. '!his 
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applies to MHS hospitals which each operate in distinctive market 
areas . Unique market factors affect MHS hospitals differentially 
and iIrlicate a need for some custom management for hospitals in dif­
ferent locales . 'nle relationship between a hospital and its corpor­
ate headquarters will vary to some extent due to local environrrental 
corrlitions that are unique for each facility in a dispersed system. 
'IWo system hospitals which may otherwise be similar can face 
canpletely different local canpetitive situations. For example, a 
hospital which operates in an environrrent with excess capacity of 
hospital beds faces much greater canpetitive pressure than does a 
hospital located in an undel:bedded market area . System headquarters 
must develop a strategic planning relationship with each hospital 
that takes into account the canpetitive pressures that managers must 
deal with, while incorporating the system' s  goals into the plans 
which are made. Who should control the hospital ' s  strategy may 
depend upon the extent of the canpetition faced by a hospital . As 
the mnnber of canpeting hospital beds grows , there may be a nore 
pressing need for local control Oller hospital strategic planning, or 
vice versa . 
Reynolds and Stunden (1978) , in addressing the level of cen-
tralized management present in not-for-profit systems, argued that 
hospitals in canpetitive markets which belong to geographically 
dispersed systems should have a great deal of autonomy in order to 
rerrain canpetitive: 
• • •  administrators have wide latitude in program develop­
ment, medical staff affairs, and operations . '!he latitude 
is enhanced in a canpetiti ve environrrent, where the admin­
istrator, trying to maintain a high census and a finan-
cially viable institution, must develop programs which 
meet the medical staff ' s  desires or face losing admissions 
to other hospitals.  Autonomy . • •  is fairly well assured. 
In contrast, Provan (1985) reasoned that, 
the m::>re COI!'p9titive the envirornrent faced by the affil­
iates of a consortium, the greater the role of the con­
sortium management organization in reducing COI!'p9tition, 
arrl thus the less autonomy affiliates will have in making 
strategic-level decisions . 
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The two statements are contradictory, arrl neither assertion is 
supported by empirical evidence . It is possible that Reynolds arrl 
Stun:len (1978) refer to operational hospital activities where Provan 
( 1985) has focused upon strategic-level decision-making. Reynolds 
arrl Stun:len specify that the geographic dispersion of the system 
makes a difference in the management approach, while Provan does not 
note the effect of geographic dispersion. 
Research Needs 
There is a need to identify the extent that local envirornrental 
factors such as COI!'p9tition can influence the whether or not the 
system leaders assume control of developing hospital strategies . To 
the exent that envirornrental factors can be controlled, further un-
derstanding of the explanatory variables which detennine the nature 
of hospital strategic planning in a MHS can be obtained. 
Research Hypotheses 
Hospitals facing greater numbers of competing hospital beds in 
their local market will have greater control over their 
strategies than will hospitals operating in less competitive 
markets. 
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Control Variables 
Geographic Region 
rue to differences in physician practice styles (e.g. , prefer­
ence for or access to outpatient rather than inpatient surgery) , 
regulatory incentives , costs , cultures, am · other factors, the 
delivery of health care varies across the regions of the united 
states (Schroeder, 1984 ; Wennberg, 1984) . '!hese differences affect 
where am how patients :receive t:reabnent. It follows that mana­
gerial approaches will vary by region, with different attitudes , 
styles , am training characterizin;J managers at work in the various 
regions . Hospitals operatin;J in certain geographic regions should 
have managerial incentives which differ from those in other u. s . 
regions . For exarrple, some hospitals have traditions of collabora­
tion with others , while others have practiced complete autonomy for 
a long time period. '!hese expected differences are based s:in1ply 
upon observed variations in medical care delivery across regions , 
therefore no direction is hypothesized. 
For this study, geographic region will serve as a control 
rather than an explanatory variable. Four regions identified by the 
AHA will be chosen : Northeast , North Central , west, and South. 
Presence of I1:::M Income Population 
Hospitals which serve large populations of poor or low income 
people may have IOClre difficulty rooetin;J bottom-line financial goals 
than other hospitals . Persons with low incomes are less likely to 
have health insurance , am may be inefficient users of emergency 
services . "Both the Sloan study am '!he Urban Institute study have 
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in:ticated that hospitals with high concentrations of uncompensated 
care have disproportionate numbers of patients who are uninsure::l am 
low income" (Wilensky, 1985) . 'Ihus median family income has been 
chosen as a control variable which is sarrewhat in:ticati ve of the 
wealth of the clientele served by a particular hospital . 
Table 6 gives a surmnary of the variables which have been 
generated from the preceding discussion, along with the hypothesized 
direction of their relationship to member hospital control over 
strategy . 
Table 6 
Hypothesized Relationship Between Selected COntingencies 
am MenU::>er Hospital control of strategy 
COntingency Variable 
Relationship to MenU::>er 
Hospital COntrol of strategy* 
MHS Level Variables 
Geographic Dispersion: extensive 
Size: large 
OWnership: Not-for-profit 
strategic type: Prospector 
stage of Growth: early 
Hospital Level Variables 
Occupancy: IaN 
Size: Absolute-large 
Relative-large 
Parent Hospital 
Type of MHS-hospital relationship: owned 
Market area : competitive 
Control Variables :  
Regional location in united states 
Median family incorre 
*Note: 0 No relationship 
+ Positive relationship 
- Negative relationship 
+ 
+ 
o 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
53 
CliAPI'ER 3 :  MEI'HOa; 
Cllapter three describes the sanple, primary an:i secoooary data, 
an:i variable measures used. Next, factor analysis of the deperrlent 
variables is addressed. Finally, the methods to be used to analyze 
these data are presented. 
Sample 
One hun:1red sixty-five potential MHSs were identified using an 
AHA listing of multi-hospital systems prepared for the year 1982 . 
Small multihospital systems were defined as those which. possessed 
seven or fewer hospital members in 1982 . '!he sanple was selected to 
ensure a representative rnnnber of MHSs across a wide range of varia­
tion, within the size limitation of two to seven hospitals . '!Wo MHS 
characteristics-size an:i ownership--were used to stratify the sam­
ple on the a priori grounds that the two characteristics are assoc­
iated with variation in hospital strategic decision-makinc;J processes 
an:i outcomes . 
out of a population of 165 systems which. met the size criter­
ion, 82 were identified for this study . '!he 82 systems were broken 
down into four categories: two, three, four to five, ani six to 
seven hospitals . Table 7 corrpares the sanple systems to the popula­
tion across size an:i ownership. As shown, the sanple includes a 
larger proportion of systems having four or more hospitals ani a 
54 
55 
Table 7 
Sample and Population of Small Multihospital Systems 
# Member SVstem OWl'lershiQ 
Hospitals 
Church- cath- Not-for- Investor- Total 
other olie profit owned 
2 4/4 5/31 10/25 0/0 19/60 
3 2/2 5/26 10/11 3/3 20/42 
4-5 5/5 5/12 10/17 5/5 25/39 
6-7 3/3 5/11 7/7 3/3 18/24 
Total 14/14 20/80 37/60 11/11 82/165 
source: AHA, 1985 
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smaller proportion of systems having two or three hospitals .  '!his 
was necessary in order to retain variability when sampling across 
ownership categories. 
'Ihe entire population of small investor-owned arrl church-other 
systems were included (11 arrl 14 systems, respectively) since these 
were less prevalent than other ownership categories. catholic sys­
tems were urrlersampled, including 20 of 80 small catholic systems, 
since these systems are aburrlant arrl are historically ll'Dre unifonn 
in their managerial approaches to system hospitals . 'lhirty-seven of 
60 not-for-profit systems were included in the sample. 'Ihe not-for­
profit systems are often diverse in their managerial approaches arrl 
thus a fairly large portion of the population was sampled to allow 
for the expected variation within this category. 
'!he Chief Executive Officers (CEDs) of each of the 82 systems 
were contacted by telephone arrl asked to participate arrl assist in 
soliciting the participation of hospital CEDs in a survey of the 
entire system. 'Ihe final sample was composed of the 62 MHSs which 
agreed to participate. When this sample is compared to the popula­
tion of systems with seven or fewer hospitals, as in Table 8 ,  the 
final sample urrlerrepresents catholic systems, overrepresents not­
for-profit arrl church-other systems , arrl is biased towards MHSs 
composed of four to seven hospitals. 
'Ihese biases are a result of the sampling strategy, which was 
not designed to produce a representative sample. 'Ihe urrlersampling 
of catholic systems produced the larger size bias , as catholic 
systems were ll'Dre likely to fall in the system size category of two 
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to three hospitals than were other systems. 
out of the 270 hospitals which corrposed the 62 systems , 164 
( 61%) participated in the member hospital CEX) sw:vey. 'lhese hospi­
tals represented 49 MRSs, or 79% of the systems that agreed to 
participate. Characteristics of the 164 participating hospitals 
reflect the MRS sample, as participating hospitals overrepresent 
not-for-profit and church-other systems and underrepresent catholic 
and very small (two and three hospital) systems , as irrlicated in 
Table 8 .  
Data 
MRS eros were initially contacted by telephone from January to 
May of 1985 . Data were gathered by interview on the system ' s  size, 
age, birth order of hospitals,  and the managerial relationship bet­
ween the system and each hospital (Le. , owned, leased, sponsored , 
contract- mnaged) . 'lhe eros were infonned that member hospital 
eros would be receiving a mail questionnaire, and cooperation of the 
MRS CEX) in the project was solicited. 
Member hospital eros were sw:veyed by mail between June and 
september of 1985 . A letter accompanied each sw:vey to solicit the 
hospital CEX) '  s cooperation, explaining that the system leader had 
participated in the study. One follOlN-up mailing to non-respondents 
was conducted. 
'!he instrument, which appears in the Appendix, contained ques­
tions that sw:veyed the hospital CEX) ' s  perceptions about hospital 
and corporate strategies that were likely to be pursued, hospital/ 
corporate culture, the level of conflict between the corporate 
Table 8 
System Affiliation of Hospital CEX:> Resporrlents 
By System ownership arrl Size 
System C'laracteristics Population, 
of Resporrlents 1982 
OWnershi:g n � N � 
Olurch-other 36 22 . 0  60 9 . 3  
catholic 41 25 . 0  282 43 . 3  
Not-far-profit 76 46 . 3  249 38 . 2  
Investor-owned 11 6 . 7  60 9 . 2  
Total 164 100 . 0  651 100 . 0  
Size n % N % 
2 hospitals 15 9 . 2  180 27 . 6  
3 hospitals 29 17 . 7  156 24 . 0  
4-5 hospitals 66 40 . 2  170 26 . 1  
6-7 hospitals 54 32 . 9  145 22 . 3  
Total 164 100 . 0  651 100 . 0  
Source: AHA, 1982 
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office am m=mber hospitals,  am the extent of centralized manage­
ment present within the system. 
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'!he 10 questions treasuring the degree of co:rporate influence on 
hospital decisions are used as deperrlent variables for this study 
am are shown in Figure 2 .  '!hese items were selected from an AHA 
survey of MHSs corxlucted in May, 1983 (Alexander & SChroer, 1985) 
am were m::xlified for the present work. 
'!he original 15 items used by Alexander am SChroer (given in 
Figure 3 )  were developed with a focus upon broader, policy-related 
decisions that hospitals made rather than upon operational deci­
sions . omitted were items that addressed certain highly hospital­
specific decisions, urrler the assumption that regardless of MHS 
membership, hospitals retain control over many operational concerns 
(Alexander, 1987) . '1herefore of each the 15 items to some extent is 
strategic in nature. 
Alexander (1987) states that the reliability am validity of 
the scale have been demonstrated during scale development, but that 
detailed infonnation regarding reliability am validity is unavail­
able. Regarding reliability, it should be noted that the' phrasing 
of the questions arrl response categories is straightforward. one 
must make the assumption that in light of the apparent silllplicity of 
the questions, participants have resporrled in a manner which would 
be consistent over time . 
While the scale ' s  reliability may be reasonably asstnned, its 
face validity may be suspect . DJe to the changing nature of the 
co:rporatization of hospitals arrl of relationships between hospitals 
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Figure 2 
Modified 1983 AHA survey Items Used in 1985 survey 
Listed below are several types of decisions made about individual 
hospital operations an:i manageroont. For each type of decision, how 
nuch influence does the CQrwrate office of this nnlltihospital 
system have? Circle one number. 
No Great Deal 
Influence of Influence 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a .  Appointment of local board 
members 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 b.  Appointment of hospital CEO 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 c.  Performance evaluation of 
hospital CEO 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 d.  Sale of hospital assets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 e .  Purchase of hospital assets 
valued greater than $100 , 000 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 f .  Olange in hospital bylaws 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 g.  Medical staff privileges 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 h. Hospital operating budgets 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 i .  Service additions at the 
hospital level 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 j .  Formulation of hospital 
strategies/long range plans 
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F i gure 3 
1 983  AHA Survey I tems 
For each a rea be l ow ci rc l e  whether i n  most cases dec i s i on - ma k i ng  respons i bi l i ty is ( 1 )  reserved 
by the corporate board; ( 2 )  de l egated to corporate management; or ( 3 )  de l egated to l oc a l  
hosp i t a l  boards . I f  dec i s i on-maki ng respons i bi l i ty i s  shared, pl ease c i rc l e  !ll appropr i ate 
responses . 
Respons i bi l i ty Respons i b i l i ty Respons i b i l i ty 
W i th Corporate Board W i th Corporate Mgt .  Wi th Local Board 
8 .  Appoi ntment o f  CEO o f  Sub- 2 3 
ordi nate Hospi ta l s  
* b .  T ransfer o f  Assets 2 3 
*c . P l edg i ng of Assets 2 3 
d .  Sa l e  o f  Assets 2 3 
e .  Purchase o f  Assets Va l ued 2 3 
Greater than 5100 , 000 
f .  Change i n  Byl aws of Sub· 2 3 
ordi nate Hospi ta l s  
g .  Med i c a l  Staff P r i vi l eges 2 3 
*h . Format i on  of New Compani es 2 3 
i .  Opera t i ng  Budgets 2 3 
*j . Capi t a l  Budgets 2 3 
k .  Formu l at i on  o f  Strategi es/Long 2 3 
Range P l ans of Sub. Hospi t a l s  
l .  Servi ce Addi t i ons a t  Hosp i t a l  2 3 
Leve l 
*m. Servi ce D e l et i ons at Hosp i t a l  2 3 
Leve l 
n .  Hospi t a l  CE O  Performance 2 3 
Eva l ua t i on  
o .  Appoi ntment of Loca l Board 2 3 
*Not e:  Not i nc l uded i n  VCU Survey, 1985 
Source: A l exande r ,  1 985 
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and corporate headquarters , the items have declined in face validity 
since 1983 when they were developed. '!hat is, other types of de­
cision areas may now be more appropriate in:licators for the assess­
ment of corporate-hospital relationships than those errployed in this 
SlllVey. For example, other strategic moves such as joint ventures, 
new product developrrent, or service marketing are nCM areas in which 
corporate control may play a large role, and these are not addressed 
in the present survey. 
As noted previously, IOOdifications were made to the AHA scale. 
Several of the original 15 AHA items appeared to overlap (e.g. , b,  
c, & d;  1 & m) , while others were expected to have lCM variability 
for the small systems in the sanple (eg. , h & j ) . In order to keep 
the SlllVey as concise as possible to encourage participation, five 
items were omitted. In addition, a Likert scale replaced the AHA 
response options to allCM for a wider range of responses . Respon­
dents were thus free to in:licate the extent to which the corporate 
office influenced each of the ten different decisions. These sel­
ected items were the basis for deperrlent measures of hospital con­
trol over strategic decisions. 
SUpplemental data sets were obtained to provide measures for 
the hospital-level indeperrlent variables used in the analysis . The 
geographic coordinates of each sanple hospital were plotted to sup­
ply infonnation about the distance between hospitals and corporate 
headquarters and about the overall geographic dispersion of the 
system. A 1982 AHA data tape provided further infonnation about 
in:lividual hospitals.  The tape contains infonnation collected by 
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the AHA from hospitals each year, incluclirg two variables, bed size 
arrl occupancy, which were used in this study . 
Finally, 1985 Area Resource File data provided infonnation ab­
out local market features which allowed for the measurement of con­
trol variables. These data were obtained from the Department of 
Health arrl Human services to analyze the impact of characteristics 
of local markets on MHS hospitals. The file contains time series 
data for many variables over the time period 1972-1980 . 
Measures 
Table 9 lists the measures arrl variable names for each of the 
incleperrlent variables discussed in Olapter '!Wo. As shown, both con­
tinuous and dichotomous measures were employed as indeperrlent var­
iables in the analysis . 
System-level measures will be described first. The measure of 
system-level geographic dispersion was the average mnnber of miles 
between hospitals in the system arrl corporate headquarters, using 
geographic coordinates . The size of the system is measured by the 
rn.nnber of hospitals belonging to the MHS . The indicator <?f system 
ownership is a dummy coding of the four-category ownership variable, 
with a value of one assigned to not-far-profit hospitals arrl a zero 
assigned to all other ownership categories . A second dummy variable 
is employed to indicate the Miles arrl Snow (1978) strategic type ( in  
this case ,  prospector) which classifies the system. Prospector sys­
tems are indicated by both a high percentage of acquisitions compos­
ing the system arrl a large mnnber of acquisitions . 
CONCEPI' 
System geographic 
dispersion 
System size 
System ownership 
Table 9 
Predictor Concepts and Measures 
MFASURE (8) VARIABlE 
NAME 
-mean distance between hospitals AVGDIS 
and corporate headquarters 
-mnnber of hospitals in MHS NOHOSP 
-Not-for-profit vs all others NFP=1 
others=O 
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System strategic type -Prospector vs all others PROSPECl'=l 
others=O 
System age 
Hospital occupancy 
Hospital size 
Parent hospital 
-1985 minus year of system 
incorporation 
-percent occupancy 
-mnnber of beds 
-proportion of system beds 
-originatin;J member of MHS 
vs all others 
Type of MHS-hospital -owned vs all other types 
relationship 
Hospital market area -number of non-MHS hospital beds 
<::orrq?etition in area /population, �980 
Regional location 
Wealth of area 
population 
-AHA regional codes (4 regions) 
-median family income 1979 
AGE 
AffilZE 
REISlZE 
PARENT=l 
others=O 
OWNED=1 
others=O 
REX; NE 
(ref) 
mx; NC 
mx;-s 
mx;-w 
INC79 
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Hospital-level measures include a variable which irrlicated one 
dimension of hospital perfonnance, occupancy rate. '!his measure is 
the average percent of occupancy for the year 1983 . '!he absolute 
size of the hospital was the number of beds at the hospital . '!he 
secorrl irrlicator of size, the relative size of the hospital , was 
measured by the number of focal hospital beds divided by the number 
of system hospital beds. Whether or not the hospital was the parent 
(originatin:]) member of the MRS was a dummy variable, with one as­
signed to parent hospitals arrl zero assigned to all non-parent hos­
pitals. '!he MRS-hospital ownership relationship was a dummy var­
iable, with one assigned to CMned hospitals and zero assigned to 
leased, srx>nsored, arrl contract-managed hospitals in the system. 
last, the competitiveness of the market area was drawn from the Area 
Resources File and was a ratio of non-MHS hospital beds in the hos­
pital ' s  COW'lty to the population in that COW'lty. 
Regional control variables were incorporated into the analysis 
using the AHA assignment of hospitals to four regions: the North­
east, North Central , South, arrl West. Finally, the hospital market 
area ' s  economic status , a secorrl control variable, Was tneasured by 
the median family inconva in the hospital ' s  county for the year 1979 . 
In order to attempt to derive a unified measure of the extent 
of corporate control over hospital strategic decisions from the 10 
smvey items discussed earlier, the items were factor analyzed using 
principle components factor analysis . Factor analysis is COltUl'Dnly 
used to simplify the inteJ:pretation of a scale and to construct sub­
scales to be employed in subsequent analyses . 
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Each item on a scale can be viewed as representing an underly­
ing concept or cilinension which can be revealed through factor analy­
sis . '!he technique of factor analysis selects a minimum rnnnber of 
di1rensions necessary to statistically approxilnate the correlation 
matrix of the original items. It produces "loadings" of variables 
upon factors which, when high, irrlicate a strong association of a 
variable with a factor. For this study, these loadings were rotated 
along orthogonal axes in order to clarify their interpretation. A 
"pure" factor structure was sought where an item loads highly on one 
di1rension or factor arrl loads minimally on all other factors. '!he 
empirical association of an item with an underlying cilinension InUSt 
be corroborated by face validity, that is, all of the items that are 
empirically associated with a cilinension InUSt logically relate to the 
sane di1rension (Tabachnick arrl Fidell ,  1983 ) . 
Factor analytic techniques were applied to items measuring cor­
porate control over 10 decision areas . Two clear underlying dimen­
sions of hospital decisions were revealed by six survey items, in­
dicating that the 10 items were measuring two clearly distinct sets 
of strategic decisions . '!he rotated factor loadings for these items 
are presented in Table 10 . 
'!he first cilinension accounted for 39% of the variance in the 
item scores . It has been labeled "Tactical Decisions" arrl includes 
the variables relating to hospital budgets, hospital service addi­
tions , arrl fonnulation of hospital strategies. 
'!he secord cilinension accounted for 27% of the variance in the 
items arrl is entitled "Periodic Decisions. " '!his factor is corrposed 
Table 10 
Factor Loadings for Deperrlent Variable Items 
VOl SUrVey 
Factor 
Item Number 
(8 )  
(9 )  
( 10)  
( 1) 
(4 )  
(6 )  
Tooic of Item 
Hospital budgets 
Service additions 
Formulation of plans 
AppointrN:mt of 00ard 
AppointrN:mt of CEX) 
Olange in Bylaws 
Percent of variance 
explained 
Total variance 
explained by 2 factors 
Tactical Periodic 
. 756 . 066 
. 873 . 069 
. 785 . 073 
. 026 . 788 
- . 023 . 815 
. 251 . 788 
. 39 . 27 
. 66 
67 
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of items relating to the appointment of local board members, the 
sale of hospital assets, ani changes in hospital bylaws. As a re­
sul t of this subscaling process, two dependent variables were cre­
ated. '!he three items loading strongly on Tactical Decisions were 
summed, with each item given an equal weight since the factor load­
ings are roughly equivalent (Johnson & Wichern, 1982 ) . '!he same 
process was applied to the secord factor, Periodic Decisions, yiel­
ding a score c:orrposed of the sum of the three strongest-loading 
variables. 
A bivariate least squares regression analysis was perfonned, 
with one factor regressed upon the other to check for shared var­
iance. '!he two factors are lOOderately correlated. '!he regression 
nx:xiel is significant, .f (l , l} = 5 . 47 ,  � . 02l, � = . 033 . 
In the explanatory portion of the analysis (Olapter 4) , an as­
sessment must be made of the impact of the irrlependent variables 
upon corporate control over two distinct but SOllYaWhat-related hos­
pital strategic decisions: tactical decisions which are ongoing, 
strategic ani policy-related, ani periodic decisions , L e . , those 
that are infrequent ani longer-tenn strategic decisions. . Separate 
analyses will be corrlucted for each of the dependent variables . 
Analysis 
'!he extent to which hospitals control their own strategic deci­
sions was analyzed using ordinary least squares regression. '!he ad­
vantages of multiple regression are its appropriateness for use with 
multiple irrlependent variables ani its ability to employ continuous 
ani dichotomous irrlependent variables (Johnson ani Wichern, 1982 ; 
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lewis-Beck, 1983 ) . It can effectively eliminate or control the ef­
fects of specific variables an:l allow examination of the influence 
of one variable with other influences partialed out, giving an in­
dication of the relative :il!1portance of a variable in explaining var­
iation in the deperxient variable. Another advantage is its resil­
ience, as regression will "tern toward the right answer \.mier any 
reasonable practical circumstances, even if a great number of the 
classical postulates are violated" (Achen, 1982 ) . Regression is a 
highly robust analytical technique an:l is especially appropriate for 
research on organizations an:l people. 
Exploratory bivariate regression was conducted by separately 
regressing each deperxient variable on each in:leperxient variable, not 
controlling for the influence of any additional variable. '!his 
technique serves to ascertain the preliminary strength of the influ­
ence of an in:leperxient variable upon the deperxient variables. 
Next, all variables were s:imu1.taneously entered into a regres­
sion lrodel for each of the two deperxient variables to ascertain the 
effect of the in:leperxient variables with other effects controlled. 
since several of the in:leperxient variables possess skewed dis­
tributions, secondary analyses were conducted to incorporate the 
normalized values of these skewed variables. 
Additionally, post hoc analysis of variable interactions was 
conducted by first checking for the bivariate significance of theor­
etically relevant interaction tenns . Interactions which were sig­
nificant were incorporated into the overall mcxlels in order to con­
trol fcor the effects of other in:leperxient variables. 
ClJAPI'ER 4 :  RESUI.lI'S 
'!his chapter presents descriptive statistics am the results of 
variable transfonnations, exploratory analyses, am regression 
analyses . A final section describes the firrlings of investigations 
which were COIrlucted to explore the results of the planned analyses 
in greater depth. 
Descriptive statistics 
'!he mean am standard deviation for each of the continuous in­
deperrlent variables are given in Table 11 . '!he categorical irxlepen­
dent variables, all dichot:arrous, are shown in Table 12, along with 
the percentage of hospitals in the semple possessing each attribute. 
'!he extent to which the variables IOOt urrlerlying asstllTptions 
for regression analysis was assessed . First, the zero order correl­
ations presented in Table 13 were examined. In only five instances 
did the correlations equal or exceed . 50 :  system size wi� system 
strategic type , . 56 ;  system ownership (NFP) with system age, - . 50 ;  
parent hospital with hospital absolute size, . 59 ;  parent hospital 
with hospital relative size, . 65 ;  am hospital relative size with 
its absolute size, . 76 .  
It appears that hospital relative size is correlated strongly 
with several other variables am that elimination of this variable 
from consideration could reduce the multicollinearity and thus , 
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Table 11 
Descriptive statistics 
continuous Variables 
Irxleperrlent Variable n 
AVGDIS (System dispersion) 164 
NOIiCSP (System size) 163 
AGE (System age) 161 
ocx:::RNI' (Hospital cx:x::upancy) 156 
ABSIZE (Hospital absolute size) 161 
REISlZE (Hospital relative size) 161 
BEIS FOP (Market c::orrpetition) 155 
INel§" (Family incame level) 155 
Table 12 
Mean 
145 . 19 
6 . 10 
29 . 49 
71 . 48 
222 . 88 
0 . 23 
0 . 01 
19 , 467 . 39 
Descriptive statistics 
D..nmny Variables 
sd 
186 . 4  
3 . 1  
26 . 4  
14 . 7  
208 . 8  
0 . 2  
0 . 0  
3 , 695 . 4  
n Percent of 
NFP (Not-for-profit system ownership) 
m::lSPECl' (Prospector system strategy) 
PARENl' (Parent hospital) 
a-mED (Hospital CMI'led by system) 
Rffi S (Hospital region- south) 
Rffi-NC (Hospital region- North central) 
Rffi -W (Hospital region- West) 
163 
166 
162 
161 
158 
158 
158 
cases 
45 . 40 
28 . 3 1  
21. 61 
66 . 46 
30 . 38 
28 . 48 
22 . 15 
71 
72 
table 13 correlation matrix 
Table 1 3  
Cor re l at i on Mat r i x  o f  I ndependent Va r i ab l es 
( Pa i rwi se n) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
TAVGO I S  1 . 46* · . 34* . 1 1  . 28* · . 19 . •  1 4  . •  29* • •  1 6  - . 1 3 
1� 1� 1M 1� 1� 1� 1� 1� 1 �  
NOHOSP 2 . 03  . 56* - . 02 - . 36* - . 20* - . 45* - . 22* - . 1 2 
1 �  1 �  1 61 1 56 161 1 61 1 �  1 61 
NFP 3 . 1 7 - . 50* - . 13 - . 1 5 - . 03 . 01 . 09  
1 �  161  1 56 161 1 61 1 �  161  
1 1  1 2  1 3  1 4  1 5  
. 05 - . 1 9 - . 02 . 2 1 *  - . 24* 
1 55 1 58 1 58 1 58 1 55 
- . 0 1  - . 01 - . 05 . 06  - . 1 7 
1 55 1 58 1 58 1 58 1 55 
- . 24* - . 1 6 - . 08  . 20 . 1 2 
1 55 1 58 1 58 1 58 1 55 
PROSPECT4 - . 45* - . 25* - . 1 1  - . 25* - . 1 2 - . 20* - . 2 1 *  - . 07 - . 05  . 0 1  - . 01 
1 61 1 56 161  161  1� 161  1 55 1 55 1 55 1 55 1 55 
AGE 5 . 13 . 13 - . 03 - . 04  - . 1 2 . 1 9 . 04  . 2 1 *  - . 1 2 . 08  
1 56 1 61 161  161  1 61 1 54 1 57 1 5 1  1 57 1 54 
OCCPCNT 6 . 47* . 45* . 28* . 23* . 1 5 . 1 5  - . 04 - . 2 1 *  . 1 5 
1 56 1 56 1 56 1 56 1 54 1 56 1 56 1 56 1 52 
ASS I ZE 7 . 76* . 59* . 2 1 *  . 1 7 . 1 7 . 01 - . 2 1 *  . 2 1 *  
1 61 1 61 1 61 1 54 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 54 
RELS IZE 8 . 65* . 22* . 1 7 . 04  . 03 - . 08 . 1 8 
161  161  1 54 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 54 
PARENT 9 . 1 7 . 1 2 . 04  . 01 - . 06 . 1 1  
1 6 1  1 55 1 58 1 58 1 58 1 55 
alNED 1 0  . 01 . 09  - . 09 . 03 . 1 8 
1 54 1 57 1 57 1 57 1 54 
BEDS_POP 1 1  . 1 3 . 1 1  - . 25* - . 26* 
1 55 1 55 1 55 1 55 
REG_S 1 2  - _ 42* - . 35* - . 1 3 
1 58 1 58 1 55 
REG_NC 13 - . 34* _ 29*  
1 58 1 55 
REG_II 1 4  - . 07 
1 55 
I NC79 1 5  
* e < . 05 
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error variance in the model . Also , relative size appears to contain 
infonnation which is connnon to the variables system size, hospital 
occupancy , hospital absolute size, and parent hospital . 'Iherefore, 
hospital relative size was dropped from subsequent analyses . 'Ihe 
intercorrelations curong the remaining variables should not affect 
the regression results to a significant extent. 
To assure that the continuous variables are nonnally distri­
buted, each was examined for deviation from nonnality. Median 
family income and system size possessed essentially nonnal distri­
butions. While hospital occupancy , system age, and market corrpet­
ition possessed skewed distributions which could not be corrected, 
logistic transfonnation greatly inproved the distribution of two 
variables: system geographic dispersion and hospital absolute size. 
'Ihe transfonnation reduced the skewness of the variables and min­
imized the inpact of extreme high and low values. 
In order to assess the inpact of the transfonnations upon the 
regression models which were developed, separate regression analyses 
were run using untransfonned and transfonned values. Inclusion of 
the transfonned values of absolute size did not lower the· standard 
error of the regression model . However, inclusion of logistic 
values of geographic dispersion substantially lowered the standard 
error of the regression model . 'Ihe sign and relative magnitude of 
the regression coefficient for geographic dispersion remained 
consistent after transfonnation. 'Iherefore, subsequent analyses 
will be reported using transfonned values of geographic dispersion. 
Due to the consistent direction of the effect of the variable, 
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interpretation remains relatively straightforward. 
categorical variables are skewed an:i deemed inappropriate for 
multivariate analysis when too few or too many observations fall 
into the category of interest. For this analysis , all durmny var­
iables possess acceptable distributions . 
Interpretation of the durmny irrleperrlent variables is as fol­
lows . '!he regression coefficient for a durmny variable represents 
the mean difference in the deperrlent variable between a category of 
interest an:i the other categories of that variable (Polissar & 
Diehr, 1982) . For example, the regression coefficient for an owned 
hospital represents the mean difference in the deperrlent variable 
between hospitals that are owned an:i hospitals which are leased, 
sponsored, or managed. 
For the control variable region, the rrost frequently occurring 
category, the Northeast region, was used as a reference category. A 
significant regional inpact upon the deperrlent variable is interpre­
ted as the deviation of other regions from the Northeast region. 
Descriptive statistics relating to the deperrlent variables are 
given in Table 14 . It can be observed that there is virtUally no 
difference in the perceived amount of control that hospitals have 
over either tactical an:i periodic decisions . '!he t-value for the 
test of the difference between the two means was . 349 an:i was not 
significant. In general , there appears to be much corporate control 
over hospital policy decisions of both types . '!here is greater var­
iance among the responses of hospital CEOs in the extent of hospital 
control over periodic decisions than over tactical decisions (see 
Table 14 
Descriptive statistics for Depen:ient Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Periodic Decisions 
Tactical Decisions 
N 
162 
166 
Mean* 
7 . 65 
7 . 81 
sd 
4 . 59 
3 . 65 
*Note: '!be range of scores is 3-21,  with higher values 
irrlicating greater hospital control . 
Table 14 ) . 
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'!be relatively small variance in both depen:ient variables may 
reduce the predictive power of regression Irodels . '!be small var-
iances may be due to the nature of the sarrple, as small systems in 
general may be substantially controlled by corporate managers . 
'!he two deperrlent variables are somewhat correlated, l' (1 , 161) = 
5 . 47 ,  12 < . 021, g2 = . 033 . Although the two decision processes are 
distinct as evidenced by factor analysis , the processes share COltUTOn 
elerrents which give them some urrlerlying sllnilarity. 
Bivariate Analyses 
Exploratory analysis of the bivariate relationships between the 
brleperrlent variables and each deperrlent variable was corrlucted in 
order to examine the prelllnincuy nature of the relationships . '!be 
intent of this analysis was to provide background infomation for 
the subsequent multivariate analysis . 
'!he significance level for hypothesis testing in this study was 
a one-tailed alpha level of . 10 .  '!his significance level was chosen 
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because over-inclusion of variables was preferred to urrler-inclu­
sion, since few of the variables urrler investigation had been exam­
ined with regard to their impact upon strategic decision-making re­
lationships . 
only the significant bivariate relationships will be disotsSed 
below. later, m:>re scrutiny will be given to the multi-variate 
m:>dels the influence of extraneous variables controlled. 
Table 15 gives the outcome of the bivariate analyses for both 
deperrlent variables . only three irrleperrlent variables were signif­
icantly related to hospital control over tactical decisions, as 
shown in the first three columns . Greater geographic dispersion in 
the system is significantly related to m:>re hospital control over 
tactical decisions . Hospitals in prospector systems have signif­
icantly less control over tactical decisions than hospitals not be­
longing to prospector systems . '!hat is, corporate headquarters in 
the more aggressive, growing systems have m:>re control over the 
ongoing strategic decisions of their hospitals . 
'Ihe fourth, fifth, and sixth columns of Table 15 show the rela­
tionships between the irrleperrlent variables and hospital Control 
over periodic strategic decisions. Contrary to the relationship for 
tactical decisions, hospitals have less control over periodic deci­
sions in dispersed systems . '!he bivariate analysis shows that in 
larger systems, hospitals have greater control over their periodic 
strategic decisions . Hospitals also have more control over their 
pericxlic appointments and najor strategic moves when they are mem­
bers of prospector systems . '!his is opposite to the direction of 
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Table 15 
Bivariate Regression Analyses 
Relationship Between Irrleperrlent Variables 
arrl Hospital Control of strategic Decisions 
Type of strategic Decision 
Tactical Pericxlic 
Irrleperrlent 
Variable B Int. t B Int. t 
TAVGDIS . 003 5 . 75 2 . 02 * -. 003 7 . 25 -1 . 65 * 
NOHaSP - . 023 7 . 93 - . 25 . 271 6 . 03 2 . 34 * 
NFP - . 583 8 . 06 -1 . 02 . 868 7 . 30 1 . 18 
PRQSPECl' -1 . 105 8 . 13 -1 . 77 * 3 . 284 6 . 72 4 . 33 * 
AGE . 014 7 . 41 1 . 31 - . 038 8 . 82 -2 . 80 * 
OCCPCNI' . 002 6 . 33 1 . 09 - . 005 11 . 26 -1 . 95 * 
ASSIZE . 002 7 . 40 1 . 38 - . 003 8 . 36 -1 . 69 
PARENI' . 572 7 . 68 . 83 - . 038 7 . 68 - . 04 
OONED -. 029 7 . 85 - . 05 -3 . 082 9 . 70 -4 . 17 * 
BECS rop 105 . 636 7 . 25 . 97 -94 . 380 8 . 28 - . 68 
REX;ION 
REX;-S -. 566 8 . 04 - . 90 -1 . 232 8 . 11 -1 . 52 * 
REX;-NC -. 382 7 . 98 - . 59 . 565 7 . 57 . 69 
REG-W . 199 7 . 83 . 29 . 379 7 . 65 . 42 
INC79 . 00002 7 . 39 . 29 . 0001 6 . 68 . 52 
* 12 < . 10 .  
Note. Positive regression coefficients iIrlicate greater hospital 
centrol . 
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the bivariate relationship for tactical decisions . Hospitals in 
newer systerrs have rrore control Oller their periodic decisions in 
comparison to the older systerrs . Again, this correlation between 
system age and periodic decisions is opposite to the correlation 
between system age and tactical decisions . Hospitals with higher 
occupancy have less Control Oller their periodic decisions than do 
hospitals with lower occupancy . '!his correlation is opposite to the 
variable ' s  correlation with tactical decisions . Hospitals which are 
owned by the system have greater corporate involvement in their per­
iodic decisions, as hypothesized. Finally, larger hospitals have 
less control Oller their periodic strategic decisions than do smaller 
hospitals . '!his firrling is opposite to that for tactical decisions . 
'!he rrost striking outcome of the bivariate analyses is that 
many in::lependent variables behave differently deperrli.ng upon the 
type of strategic decision to be made. '!he variables geographic 
dispersion, prospector strategy, hospital cx:x::upancy, and hospital 
absolute size have opposite effects on each of the dependent 
variables. 
While these results are interesting as an exploratorY look at 
the in::lependent and dependent variable relationships 1 further 
analyses are :inperative in order to control the effects of other 
variables. Because the variables share variance with one another, 
the effects of other in::lependent variables nrust be partialled out in 
order to correctly assess the tnle nature of the relationship bet­
ween each in::lependent variable and the dependent variables. 
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Multivariate Analyses 
'IWo separate multiple regression analyses were perfonned. All 
independent variables were included simultaneously in each model to 
control for the effects of Wependent variables upon the dependent 
variable arrl upon each other. 
In presentin:] regression results, four statistics are reported 
for each independent variable for the purpose of interpretive flex­
ibility. First, the regression weight, B, indicates the anount of 
change in the dependent variable which is attributed to an indepen­
dent variable. Second, the :t value of that regression weight arrl 
its significance evaluated at a one-tailed alpha level of . 10 is 
, reported. 
'Ihird, the squared semipartial correlation (�) is given. 
'!his statistic is "probably the sin:]le ll'OSt useful measure of the 
iInportance of an Wependent variable" (Tabachnick & Fidell , 1982 ) . 
When independent variables are intercorrelated, regression weights 
arrl correlations can earlY redurrlant or misleadin:] infonnation. For 
each independent variable, the regression weights reflect not only 
. variance shared with the dependent variable but also variance shared 
with other independent variables. '!he semipartial correlation gives 
the "unique contribution of the independent variable as a proportion 
of total variance of the dependent variable" (Tabachnick & Fidell ,  
1982) . '!he squared semipartial correlation statistic shows the a­
rocrunt that B2 or variance accounted for would be reduce:i if a varia­
ble were not entered into the equation (Tabachnick & Fidell , 1982 ) . 
Fourth, a more commonly used statistic indicatin:] the iInpor-
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tance of a variable is its starrlardized beta weight (STB) . 'Ibis 
gives the regression coefficient when all variables have been stan­
dardized. '!he stamardized beta weight is the ntnnber of standard 
deviations that the deperrlent variable will change when the in:1epen­
dent variable changes by one standard deviation (Achen, 1982 ) . 
starrlardization allows for an easy comparison of the size of effects 
across in:1eperrlent variables . 
Additionally, several statistics describing the overall IOOdel 
are provided. '!he B2 or proportion of variance explained by the 
IOOdel is given, alan;)' with its adjusted value. '!he unadjusted B2 
can be overestimated, since this statistic can never have negative 
values (all chance fluctuations in B2 will be in the positive direc­
tion) . In adjusting the B2 , correction is made for the e:xpect.ed 
inflation in B2 using a sarrple size adjustment tenn . '!his corrects 
for larger amounts of chance error present with smaller sarrples . 
Significance of Regression Mcx:lels 
As shown in Table 16 , '!he chosen in:1eperrlent variables were 
able to account for a significant proportion of the variaJ:1C9 in 
hospital control over tactical decisions, f ( 14 , 139)  = 1. 655 , � < 
. 072 . '!he proportion of variance explained (B2) ,  unadjusted, is 
. 1429 and with the adjustment falls to . 0565 . '!his IOOdel is signif­
icant but not dramatically so . '!he significance of this IOOdel ap­
pears to be due to the influence of several stron;)' variables to be 
discussed in:1ividually belCM. 
'!he in:1eperrlent variables are even stron;)'er in their ability to 
explain variance in hospital control over periodic or less frequent 
Table 16 
Regression Estimates for Hospital Control OVer 
Tactical Cecisions 
Inleperrlent Var. B 
TAVGDIS . 747 
NOHaSP . 017 
NFP . 727 
PROSPEcr -2 . 182 
AGE -. 010 
ClC.'CRNI' . 001 
ASSIZE . 002 
PARENl' . 193 
CMNED -. 700 
BEOO FOP 73 . 137 
mx;ION 
REX;-S -1 . 523 
REX;-NC -1 . 594 
mx:;-w -1. 335 
INC79 . 001 
INI'ERCEPI' -20 . 976 
OVerall Model 
R2 = . 1429 
B2 (adj . )  = . 0565 
f (14 , 139) = 1 . 66 
I? < . 072 
* I? < . 10 
t sr2 
3 . 15 * . 061 
. 12  . 000 
. 98 . 006 
-2 . 20 * . 030 
- . 60 . 002 
. 31 . 001 
. 86 . 005 
. 22 . 000 
-1 . 01 . 006 
. 59 . 002 
-1 . 32 . 011 
-1 . 67 * . 017 
-1 . 38 . 012 
1 . 35 . 011 
-7 . 10 0 
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STB 
. 33 
. 01 
. 10 
- . 27 
- . 07 
. 03 
. 10 
. 02 
- . 09 
. 06 
- . 15 
- . 20 
- . 15 
. 13 
0 
Note. Positive regression coefficients irrlicate greater hospital 
control . 
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strategic decisions, shown in Table 17 . Although periodic arrl tac­
tical decisions are somewhat related, periodic decisions are influ­
enced by different enviromnental arrl organizational features than 
tactical decisions , as evidenced by the direction arrl strength of 
the effect of inleperrlent variables . '!he regression model is sig­
nificant, I (14 , 136) = 3 . 039 , 1;1 < . 0004 . '!he inleperrlent variables 
are able to explain a large portion of the variance , with B2 =. 2383 
arrl adjusted � =. 1599 . Evidently the inleperrlent variables are 
stronger in their relationship to periodic decisions, as this model 
explains rrore variance than does the other. Again, it appears that 
several strong variables contribute to the strength of the overall 
model . 
Significance of Individual Variables 
Geographic Dispersion 
It was expected that hospitals in geographically dispersed sys­
tems would control their own strategic decisions to a greater degree 
than hospitals in proxllnal systems . '!he results of the regression 
analyses inlicate that for tactical decisions, the hypothesized 
relationship received support (.t (165) = 3 . 15 ,  1;1 < . 0020) . In fact, 
the variable TAVGDIS is the rrost important explanato:ry variable in 
the model , possessing the largest squared semipartial correlation 
( . 061) arrl starx:1ardi.zed beta ( . 33 )  shown in Table 16 . Hospitals in 
dispersed systems retain a significant amount of control over their 
tactical decisions , showing that distance evidently is a barrier to 
regular involvement by corporate headquarters . '!his finling con-
Table 17 
Regression Estimates of Hospital Control OVer 
Periodic Decisions 
Independent Var. B 
TAVGDIS .106 
NOHOSP .152 
NFP -.365 
PRQSPECI' .988 
AGE -.042 
OCCPCNI' .000 
AffilZE -.003 
PARENI' 1.461 
OONED -3.369 
BECS EOP 105.054 
REX;ION 
REX; S -.022 
REX; NC .432 
REX; W .297 
INC79 .001 
INTERCEPI' -18.941 
OVerall Medel 
� = . 2383 
B2 (adj . )  = .1599 
1 (14 ,136) = 3.04 
g < .0004 
* g < .10 
t sr2 
.37 .001 
.91 .005 
-.40 .001 
.82 .004 
-2.17 * .026 
.02 .000 
-1.19 .008 
1.38 .011 
-4.04 * .092 
.71 .003 
-.02 .000 
.37 .001 
.25 .001 
1.84 * .019 
-5.30 * 0 
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STB 
.04 
.10 
-.04 
.10 
-.24 
.00 
- . 12 
.13 
-.34 
.06 
-.00 
.04 
.03 
.17 
0 
Note. Positive regression co-efficients irrlicate greater hospital 
control . 
finns results documented elsewhere (Alexarrler & Schroer, 1985 ; 
Kochen, 1980) . 
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Interestingly, Table 17 shows that there is no significant rel­
ationship between the geographic dispersion variable, TAVGDIS ,  and 
the deperrlent variable for control over periodic, less frequent 
strategic decisions (t (165) = . 37 ,  :g < . 7111) . Although for the 
regular decisions, distance plays a clear role in enhancing hospital 
decision-making control , distance does not seem to affect involve­
ment by corporate headquarters in periodic decisions. 
MHS Size 
It was hypothesized that hospitals in larger systems would have 
greater control over their strategic decisions than hospitals in 
smaller systems . Neither regression analysis confinns this hypo­
thesis . For tactical decisions, the size of the system has no ef­
fect on the arrount of control held by the hospital (t (165) = . 12 ,  
:g < . 9050) . Similarly, size has no relationship with periodic or 
infrequent strategic decisions, Ct (165) = - . 91 ,  :g < . 3655) . 
Not-For-Profit System OWnershi:g 
For both types of decisions , not-far-profit system ownership is 
not a significant predictor of hospital control over strategic deci­
sions . '!he ,t-value for its relationship with tactical decisions is 
. 98 ,  (df=165 , :g < . 3300) while the ,t-value for periodic decisions is 
- . 40 (df=165 , :g < . 6868) . '!he results of both regression analyses 
confinn the hypothesis that not-for-profit systems are no different 
fran other ownership types in the arrount of control hospitals have 
85 
over strategic decisions. 
A caution should be made before concluding that not-for-profit 
systems are no different on this dimension than other systems . Not­
for-profit systems are typically smaller, newer, and lTIOre proxllnally 
located than the others . In contrast, ll'OSt catholic systems are 
widely dispersed and , on the average, have existed for many lTIOre 
years. OWnership may have an in'pact via these other variables, 
L e. , system geographic dispersion and age. When the effects of 
these other variables are rem::wed, however, ownership is not signif­
icant in itself. 
Prospector Systems 
'!he managers of hospitals in prospector systems were expected 
to have lTIOre control of hospital activities in general due to . the 
corporate focus upon expansion and growth of the entire system. 
COntrary to this hypothesis, nembership in a prospector system is 
significantly associated with hospitals having less control over 
their tactical decisions (t (165) = -2 . 20 ,  I? < . 0293 ) . In other 
words, the corporate headquarters of prospector systems �ve greater 
control over the daily, tactical decisions made about hospital stra­
tegy and policy. 
For periodic decisions, the results fail to support the hypo­
thesis (t (165) = . 82 ,  I? < . 4123 ) . '!he aggressiveness of the system 
in acquiring hospitals does not appear to relate to whether or not 
the hospital retains control over its periodic strategic decisions. 
'!he system headquarters of a prospector system appears to be lTIOre 
concerned with the daily management of a hospital and its tactical 
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maneuvers and is less involved with its board corrposition, sale of 
assets, or changing the hospital bylaws. 
system Age 
It was expected that hospitals belonging to newer systems would 
have less control Oller their strategic decisions than those in nore 
established systems . For tactical decisions, the regression results 
do not corroborate this hypothesis (t (165) = - . 60 ,  � < . 5490) . '!he 
influence of the age of the system is minimal in determining which 
entity controls tactical decision-making. 
In contrast, the age of the system is significant in the 0ppo­
site direction than hypothesized for periodic strategic decisions 
(t (165) = -2 . 17 ,  � < . 0321) . Hospitals in the early stage of system 
incorporation have more control Oller their periodic strategic deci­
sions than hospitals belonging to older, nore established systems . 
'!he effect of age on periodic decisions may be due to bureaucratic 
controls for the choice of CEO and board membership which have been 
built up Oller time. '!hat is, an older system may have developed 
decision-making processes and roles to gOllern the choice c:>f eros or 
board members , while newer systems may be involving hospital leader­
ship nore extensively as these processes are developed. 
Hospital Occupancy 
It was expected that hospitals with low occupancy rates would 
have less control Oller their strategic decisions than hospitals with 
higher occupancy rates, since corporate headquarters was expected to 
be more concerned and involved with less efficient hospitals . For 
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tactical decisions, occupancy has no iIrpact in this study (.t (165) = 
. 31 ,  12 < . 7589) . Similarly, for periodic strategic decisions, occu­
pancy is not a significant predictor (.t (165) = . 02 ,  12 < . 9849) . 
Occupancy does not appear to be an iInportant factor in the control 
aver strategic decision-making in hospital members of systems in 
this study. 
Hospital Size 
It was � that large hospitals would have rore control 
than small hospitals aver all kin::1s of decisions, in this case stra­
tegic decisions. For tactical decisions, the results show no rela­
tionship between a hospital ' s  size an:i its control aver tactical 
decisions (.t (165) = . 86 ,  12 < . 3892) . Likewise, there is no support 
for the hypothesis that larger hospitals have rore control aver 
periodic strategic decisions (.t (165) = -1 . 19 ,  12 < . 2378) . 
Parent Hospital 
It was hypothesized that originating members of hospital sys­
tems ,  or parent hospitals,  would have significantly rore control 
aver their strategic decisions than would nonparent hospitals.  For 
tactical decisions, this effect is not demonstrated (.t (165) =. 22 ,  
12 < . 8266) . 'Ihere is a Iroderate but statistically insignificant 
terx:l.ency for parent hospitals to have rore control aver their per­
iodic decisions (.t (165) = 1 . 38 , 12 < . 1697) . 
Hospital Owned By System 
It was � that hospitals which were owned by the system 
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would have less control over their strategic decisions than hos­
pitals which were leased, managed, or sponsored by the system. Al­
though the results are not significant, owned hospitals ten:i to have 
less control over their tactical decisions in this study Ct ( 165) = 
-1. 01 ,  :g < . 3134) . '!he regression weight is moderate and in the 
hypothesized direction. 
With regard to periodic strategic decisions, system ownership 
of the hospital is the most important explanatory variable in the 
model , as it possesses the largest squared semipartial correlation 
and starrlardized beta shown in Table 17 . '!he results of the reg­
ression lend support to the hypothesis that hospitals which are 
owned have less control over their periodic strategic decisions 
(:t ( 165) = -4 . 04 ,  :g < . 0001) . '!he effect on strategic decision­
making of hospital ownership by the system is in the same direction 
for both types of strategic decisions , giving a strong irrlication 
that corporate management becomes lOOre invested and involved in 
hospital strategic management when it owns the facility. 
Hospital Market Competitiveness 
It was expected that hospitals in lOOre competitive market areas 
would have lOOre control over their strategic decisions in order to 
enable them to function quickly and adaptively in their local mar­
kets . However, the effect of market area competition on hospital 
control over its tactical decisions is not significant (:t ( 165) = 
. 60 ,  :g < . 5534 ) . Likewise , competition in the market area as meas­
ured in this study has no impact upon whether or not hospitals 
retain control over periodic strategic decisions (:t ( 165) = . 71 , 
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:g < . 4800) . 
Control Variables 
Region. As expected , variations in the deperxjent variables can be 
attributed to regional factors. Hospitals in the North central 
region have significantly less cx:>ntrol over their tactical decisions 
than hospitals in the Northeast region in this study (t ( 165) = 
-1. 67 ,  :g < . 0968) . Region is not associated with hospital cx:>ntrol 
over periodic decisions. 
Family Income . A higher median family incoma is significantly as­
sociated with hospitals having JOOre cx:>ntrol over their periodic 
strategic decisions (t ( 165) = 1 . 84 , :g < . 0685) . '!hat is, hospitals 
located in a JOOre prosperous market area have less cx:>rporate in­
volvement with periodic strategic decisions. Family incoma is not 
significantly associated with cx:>ntrol over tactical decisions 
(t (165) = 1 . 35 ,  :g < . 1793) . It is possible that hospitals in weal­
thier market areas, with a higher proportion of paying patients, 
would have less difficulty in meeting bottom-line financial goals in 
general . Corporate involvement in att:enpting to improve the hospi­
tal ' s  performance would be less necessary . 
Analysis of Interaction Terms 
In order to explore the possibility of having statistically 
significant interaction effects, interactions between indeperxjent 
variables were analyzed post hoc in a separate regression model for 
each of the deperxjent variables. No first order interaction tenns 
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were significantly related to hospital control over pericxtic strate­
gic decisions in multivariate regression analyses. 
one first order interaction term was found to be significantly 
related to a hospital ' s  control over tactical decisions as shown in 
Table 18 . '!he system' s age interacts with its geographic dispersion 
in determining the extent to which a hospital controls tactical de­
cisions (t (165) = 2 . 00 ,  12 < . 0477) . 'Ihe overall model, conposed of 
all the previously described Weperrlent variables plus the interac­
tion term AGE * TAVGDIS is significant in explaining hospital con­
trol of tactical decisions (l (15 , 138 )  = 1 . 844 , 12 < . 0343 ) . As 
shown in Table 18 , the B-2 is . 1669 , ani the adjusted B-2 is . 0764 . 
In order to ascertain the nature of the interaction effect, the 
variables age ani geographic dispersion were dichotomized at their 
medians ani the data cross tabulated. An analysis of variance was 
corrlucted to detennine whether or not the cell means were signifi­
cantly different. Table 19 shows this cross-tabulation. At least 
two of the cell means were significantly different (F (3 , 118) =  3 . 94 ,  
12 < . 0103 ) . 'Ihe Scheffe ' test of all possible pairwise cell c:orrpar­
isons was then corrlucted to ascertain which cell means were signif­
icantly different. As Table 19 shows , in this study, hospitals in 
older, dispersed systems have more control over their tactical deci­
sions than any other hospitals (11 = 9 . 41) , especially in c:orrparison 
to those in older, 12roximal systems (11 = 5 . 89 ) . 'Ihe Scheffe l post 
hoc c:orrparison showed a significant difference in the amount of 
hospital control between hospitals in older, dispersed systems ani 
hospitals older, proximal systems . 
Table lS 
Regression Estinates for Hospital Control OVer 
Tactical Decisions (Interaction Analysis) 
Independent Var. B t sr2 
TAVGDIS . 345 1 . 12  . OOS 
NOHQSP -. 010 - . 07 . 000 
NFP . 6S2 . 93 . 005 
PROSPECl' -1 . 905 -1. 92 * . 022 
AGE -. 077 -2 . 07 * . 026 
0CCPCNl' . 001 . 30 . 001 
AB'3IZE . 002 . 7S . 004 
PARENl' . 070 . OS . 000 
OONED -. 633 - . 92 . 005 
BEI:S FOP 75 . 3S1 . 62 . 002 
REX;ION 
REX; S -1 . 136 -1 . 32 . 010 
REX; NC -1 . 467 -1 . 55 . 015 
REX; W -1 . 392 -1 . 45 . 0l3 
INC79 . 001 1 . 23 . 009 
AGE * TAVGDIS . 015 2 . 00 * . 024 
INTERCEFT -19 . 018 -6 . 17 0 
OVerall Model 
R2 
= . 1669 
B2 (adj . )  = . 0764 
I ( 15 , 13S )  = 1 . S4 
1:1 < . 0343 
* 1:1 < . 10 
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STB 
. 15 
- . 01 
. 09 
- . 23 
- . 56 
. 03 
. OS 
. 01 
- . OS 
. 06 
- . 14 
- . IS 
- . 16 
. 12  
. 60 
0 
Note. Positive regression coefficients indicate greater hospital 
control . 
Table 19 
Mean level of Hospital COntrol Over Tactical Decisions 
by System Age an::l Geographic Dispersiona 
System Age 
0-21 Years 
22 + Years 
Average Distance Between System Hospitals 
0-64 Miles 
7 . 57 
(rr58) 
5 . 89* 
(rr28) 
65 + Miles 
7 . 38 
(rr24) 
9 . 41* 
(rr51) 
a 'nle range of scores is 3-21,  with higher values irrlicating 
greater hospital control . 
* Mean values of cells 3 & 4 are significantly different, IL < . 05 
(SCheffe l Pairwise Comparison Test) 
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SUbsequent analysis showed that catholic system hospitals have 
a significantly higher mean value of (system age * geographic dis­
persion) than the combined mean of other ownership categories, 316 . 1  
arrl 65 . 7 ,  respectively. '!he �-test value for the difference in 
these means is 11 . 0  arrl is significant at alpha = . 10 .  '!his con­
finns the well-known phenomenon that, in general , catholic MHSs 
operate with a great deal of decentralization, giving extensive con­
trol to hospital leadership. 
Although the variable measuring the aggressiveness of growth in 
the system, ffiOSPECl', is still significant in the expan;:led model 
(� (165) = -1. 92 ,  � < . 0564) , the inclusion of the interaction tenn 
in the model changes the impact of certain other variables . When 
the interaction tenn is included, geographic dispersion is no longer 
significantly related to hospital control over tactical decisions 
(� (165) = 1 . 12 ,  � < . 2669) . '!he direction arrl magnitude of the 
regression weight still suggest that when dispersion is higher, hos­
pitals have lOClre control over their tactiCal decisions . When the 
combined effects of system age arrl geographic dispersion are par­
tialled out, the solo effect of distance is weak. It is evident 
that, for tactical decisions, the impact of distance relates lcugely 
to the age of the system. 
When the effect of the interaction between system age arrl geo­
graphic dispersion is partialled out, age alone is significant 
(� (165) = -2 . 07 ,  � < . 0408) , while in the previous model it was not. 
Managers in hospitals belonging to older systems have significantly 
less control over their tactical decisions than do managers of lOClre 
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newly incorp::>rated MHSs . 
'1l1e apparently strong influence of the catholic system manage­
ment on the relationship between the iOOependent variables and tac­
tical decisions warranted further inquiry. 'rhus, an additional reg­
ression was corrlucted, explicitly controlling for catholic system 
ownership, excluding the not-for-profit dununy variable, and includ­
ing all the renaining iOOependent variables, including the first 
order interaction tenn. 
Table 20 gives the estiInates for this regression lOOdel .  As 
shown, the lOOdel is significant, l ( 15 ,  138 )  = 2 . 01 ,  � < . 0184 . B-2 
is ilrproved to . 1795 with the adjusted value of . 0903 . 'Ibis lOOdel 
appears to be the best one for explaining hospital control aver tac­
tical decisions, as the effects of the iOOependent variables have 
been clarified and B-2 renains strong. 'IWo variables are signifi­
cantly associated with less hospital control of tactical decisions : 
hospitals in prospector (t (165) = -1 . 96 ,  � < . 0517)  and in older 
systems (t (165) = -2 . 50 ,  � < . 0136) . In fact, system age is the 
strongest variable in the explanato:r:y lOOdel (sr2 = . 037 , STB = 
- . 66) . 'rhe dununy variable Wicating catholic system ownersru.p, 
CA'IH, is significantly associated with IOC>re hospital control of 
tactical decisions (t (165) = 1 . 73 ,  � < . 0863 ) . 
surprisingly, the interaction tenn, (system age * geographic 
dispersion) , approaches significance in its association with greater 
hospital control aver tactical decisions (t (165) = 1 . 56 ,  � < . 1202 ) . 
With catholic effects excluded, once again, the greatest difference 
in the mean value of hospital control aver tactical decisions can be 
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Table 20 
Regression Estimates of Hospital COntrol CNer Tactical Decisions 
Best-fitting Model 
Independent Var. B t sr2 STB 
TAVGDIS . 241 . 81 . 004 . 11 
�p . 040 . 29 . 001 . 03 
PROSFECI' -. 1924 -1 . 96 * . 023 - . 24 
AGE -. 092 -2 . 50 * . 037 - . 66 
0CCPCNl' . 001 . 28 . 001 . 03 
AffilZE . 001 . 67 . 003 . 07 
PARENl' . 019 . 02 . 000 . 01 
G7NED - . 628 - . 92 . 005 - . 08 
BECS rop 69 . 756 . 58 . 003 . 05 
REX;ION 
REX; S -. 508 - . 55 . 003 - . 06 
REX; NC -. 838 - . 89 . 005 - . 10 
REX; W -. 955 -1 . 01 . 006 - . 11 
INC79 . 001 1 . 29 . 010 . 12 
CMH 1 . 949 1 . 73 * . 018 . 23 
AGE * TAVGDIS . 012 1 . 56 . 015 . 48 
INl'ERCEPl' -18 . 694 -6 . 25 0 0 
OVerall Model 
� = . 1795 
g2 (adj . )  = . 0903 
f ( 15 , 138 )  = 2 . 01 
12 < . 0184 
* 12 < . 10 
Note. Positive regression co-efficients irrlicate greater hospital 
control . 
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fourxi between hospital IreITlbers of proximal versus dispersed older 
systems .  
SUImnary of Inportant FWings 
Table 21 provides a S\.lI!IlllarY of the :i.nq;x>rtant fWings from the 
best ll'Odel for each regression analysis. 'lhese fWings will be 
discussed in detail in the final chapter. 
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Table 21 
surmnary of Important Regression Results 
fran Best Regression Models 
Relationship to Member Hospital 
Cont.i.rgency Variable COntrol of strategic Decisionsa 
Tactichl 
MHS Level Hypothesized Decisions 
Geographic Dispersion -++ 0 
Size -++ 0 
ownership: 
Not-for-profit 0 0 
catholic na -++ 
strategic Type: 
Prospector -++ 
Age -++ 
Age * Dispersion na + 
Hospital Level 
Occupancy -++ 0 
Absolute size -++ 0 
Parent Hospital -++ 0 
Type of MHS-Hospital 
Relationship CMne.d 
Competitive Market 
Area -++ 0 
a -++statistically significant positive relationship 
+ Non-significant but rroderate positive relationship 
o No relationship 
- Non-significant but rroderate negative relationship 
-Statistically significant negative relationship 
Periodic 
Decisions 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
ClJAPl'ER 5 :  DISmSSION AND <X>NCIIJSIONS 
'!he pw:p:>Se of the final chapter is to summarize anj discuss 
the lirportant contributions of this research , to present the 
managenent inplications of the empirical findings, anj , in the 
context of the findings anj limitations of this research , propose 
needs for future research . 
Significant Contributions 
'!here are three areas in -which this research can offer signif­
icant contributions to the study of Imlltihospital systems . First, 
through the application of the Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory, arrl 
Wilson (1986) typology of top organizational decisions, a broader 
perspective on strategic decision-making within a hospital system is 
made possible. Second, specific empirical findings can offer ad­
vances to the knowledge base relating to effective management in 
hospital members of MHSs. 'Ihird, insights into the application of 
the contingency perspective are offered. 
Strategic Decisions 
'!his section will examine the contributions of this study to 
the development of a better urrlerstanding of strategic decisions in 
MHSs. '!he introductory chapter pointed out that, rather than inves­
tigating variables -which influence the overall level of decentral-
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ization in MHSs, research was need  to examine the level of decen­
tralization for specific functional areas , such as strategic plan­
ning. '!his study confinned the legitimacy of such work, arrl re­
vealed the multi-dimensional nature of hospital strategic decisions. 
Briefly, analysis revealed a two-factor structure to the depen­
dent variable scale: a factor dealing with periodic, less frequent 
decisions such as local board appointments, sale of hospital assets ,  
arrl changes in hospital bylaws; arrl a secorrl factor COITpOSed of 
items more tactical in nature: hospital budgets, service additions, 
arrl strategic planning. At first glance , it appears somewhat sur­
prising that hospital strategic planning loaded on the tactical 
dimension, since strategic planning is often viewed as a function 
which occurs periodically in a hospital . '!he assumption must be 
made that strategic planning loaded on the tactical factor due to 
its likely manifestation as an incremental "stream of ilTIportant 
decisions over ti1ne" (Mintzberg, 1978) rather than as a periodic, 
fontal planning process . 
'!he two factors were correlated, irrlicating that, although 
there are different levels of hospital control for different types 
of strategic decisions, strategic decision-making processes in MHSs 
share certain comrronali ties, regardless of the type of decision 
urrler consideration. Evidently there is a "baseline" level of hos­
pital control over decisions which depends upon specific organiza­
tional features. 
Based on the results of the present work, it is not possible to 
make any generalizations about the overall level of control that 
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hospitals have Oller their strategic decisions. One must qualify 
such statements in te.nns of particular kinds of strategic decisions . 
Midway through this research, a useful strategic decision-making 
IOOdel was published by a group of British researchers . While the 
IOOdel would have been useful during the design phase of the study, 
its firrlings can nevertheless be helpful in understarrling the 
results of the current research. 
'!he fraIllE!toJOrk, presented by Hickson et al e ( 1986) in their 
book, Top Decisions, examines the nature of different types of 
strategic decisions. OVer a ten year period, this research team 
gathered data from 150 retrospective case histories of decision­
making in 30 British companies, using intaviews and examining 
records of decision-making. By classifying the decisions under in­
vestigation, they devised a nx:xiel of strategic decision processes 
which were associated with particular � .of strategic decisions . 
Using cluster analysis, Hickson et al e (1986) grouped the data 
along two dimensions: discontinuity and dispersion of decision pro­
cesses . Discontinuity refers to the ntnnber of disruptions or delays 
which characterize the decision-making process . Dispersion refers 
to the number of people involved in the process , i .  e. , the more 
people or organizational subgroups involved, the more dispersed the 
process . 
'!hey uncovered three clearly disce.rnable decision-making pro­
cesses based on these two dimensions: a) sporadic ; b) fluid; and c) 
constricted. Figure 4 exhibits the positioning of Hickson et al e ' s  
clusters along each of these two dimensions. 
Figure 4 
'Ihree Modes of Decision-Making Based on 
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A sporadic decision process is "one that is infonnally spas-
medic and protracted (Hickson, et al . ,  1986) . "  '!hat is, information 
comes in with uneven quality, there is nuch room for negotiation and 
discussion, and t}v::>....re are disruption, delays, i.mpedllnents, and re-
sistance. All of these lead to a decision process which becomes 
quite tiIre consuming. 
Decisions which are likely to be processed in a sporadic manner 
are tenned ''vortex'' by Hickson, et al . (1986) . Vortex decisions 
tend to involve a combination of highly c:orrplex and political fea-
tures, tend to be rare, have serious and widespread consequences, be 
precedent-setting, involve diverse internal and external inflUences, 
and be controversial (Hickson, et al . , 1986) . 
In contrast, fluid processes differ :fllroamentally fram sporadic 
processes along the discontinuity dimension. 
'!he contrast between fluid processes and sporadic 
processes shares something with that frequently made 
between ' rational ' and 'political ' decision-making, the 
rational flowing more evenly and the political more 
turbulently (Hickson, et al . ,  1986 ,  p .  121 ;  Miles, 1980,  
p .  181) . 
Fluid decision processes take place with regularly occurring meet­
ings, pre-arranged project or work groups , and fewer inputs fram 
internal and external experts. Rather than in'prling the decision 
flow, fonnally arranged committees seem to facilitate a rapid con-
elusion of these decision processes . 
Fluid decision processes are often triggered by "tractable" de-
cis ion topics, or those which are unusual but less awkward and more 
malleable than vortex decisions (Hickson, et al . ,  1986) . Tractable 
decisions are less deserving of the label "strategic, " compared to 
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vortex, SIX'radic processes . COnsequences of these decisions are 
less serious, although widespread; the decisions are non-conten­
tious, evenly influenced, less COItplex, and least political of the 
decisions urrler investigation. Tractable decision topics often re­
late to organizational bourrlaries and inputs (Hickson, et al . , 1986) . 
Finally, Hickson et al . (1986) identified a third decision pro­
cess , constricted, which shares aspects of the other two process yet 
differs from them along the dispersion dimension, being less disper­
sed with regard to involvement by organizational members . Narrowly 
channeled, constricted processes share the delays which characterize 
SIX'radic processes , involve numerous experts and sources of infonna­
tion, and are less controversial than SIX'radic, possessing a narrcM­
er scope for negotiation. A constricted decision process is "less 
fluid than the fluids and less SIX'radic than the SIX'radics" 
(Hickson, et al . ,  1986) , not stirring up as much activity as the 
other two processes . 
constricted processes are triggered by familiar, recognizable, 
and limited decision topics. 'lhese situations have limited con­
sequences am are the least COItplex of strategic decisionS. 'lhus 
they are generally lov.r-risk decisions which have been carried out 
routinely by decision-makers who follov.r a familiar pattern of estab­
lished rules and procedures. 
'lhe Hickson, et al . (1986) strategic decision typology supports 
and advances previous work by Miles (1980) , stein ( 1981) , Mintzberg 
(1983 ) , and others by providing a furrlamental explanation for stra­
tegic decisions and associated decision processes . A manager who 
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can describe a decision as vortex, tractable, or familiar can expect 
that the related decision process will be sporadic, fluid, or con­
stricted, respectively, in the majority of instances . 
'!he Hickson, et al .  (1986) IrOdel can be applied to the strate­
gic decisions currently urrler investigation. All three of the 
decisions represented. urrler the factor, tactical decisions, could be 
labeled "tractable, fluid" urrler the Hickson, et al . schema (1986) , 
with tractable describiIq the difficulty or complexity of the deci­
sion, ani fluid describiIq the nature of the process by which the 
decision is made. Tractable, fluid decisions are characterized by 
somewhat constricted involvement of decision-makers rather than 
wide-scale involvement at all levels and units of the organization. 
'!hese decisions are not routine , yet they are not rare . '!he deci­
sions are not highly political or controversial, ani are often 
reached through regular canunittee work in an incremental , continuous 
process . Tractable, fluid decisions often are precursi ve in that 
they set parameters for future decisions and often relate to finan­
cial or input matters such as acquisition of resources or furrling . 
Although these decisions are widely felt throughout the oi:ganiza­
tion, they do not have suc1den or dramatic effect. 
'!he classification of the items composiIq the "periodic deci­
sions" factor is less obvious, but they are clearly distinct from 
the tactical decisions based upon the discontinuity dbnension pro­
posed by Hickson, et al . (1986) . Appointment of local board mem­
bers , sale of hospital assets, and changes in hospital bylaws are 
all decisions which are not routinely made. '!hey most closely match 
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the category "vortex, sporadic" in Hickson, et al e ' s  (1986) design, 
in that the decisions are likely to be controversial anj inportant 
decisions which are processed in a rrore sporadic manner. '!he scope 
for negotiation is broad, anj there is infonnal contact anj on anj 
off discussion involving a diversity of infonnation sources . Vor­
tex, sporadic decisions are often novei anj involve greater risk to 
the organization as a whole, anj as such, are often highly politi­
cal . While periodic decisions may not be as highly risky anj con­
troversial as the Hickson, et al e prototype, vortex decisions, they 
are clearly rrore political anj have greater potential �ct upon 
the organization as a whole than the tactical decisions. '!hus the 
present study supports the thrust of the Hickson, et al e ( 1986) 
typology for strategic decisions. 
'!he correlation of the two decision types despite a relatively 
clean factor structure (high loadings on one factor with very low 
loadings on the other - see Table 10) is better urrlerstood if 
viewed from the perspective that the factors share similarities 
along one dimension of the Hickson et al e typology, but differ on 
another. '!hat is, both periodic anj tactical decisions can be 
viewed as moderately dispersed decision processes , yet differ in 
that periodic decisions tend to be more sporadic anj tactical deci­
sions more fluid. 
'!his research has also depicted the complexity of the process 
of organizational decision-making. Mintzberg (1983)  has described 
the process of decision-making as a sequence of events over which 
diverse subgroups can exert control . Mintzberg goes on to assert 
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that power over different kin:1s of decisions rests in different 
places within an organization, usually based upon control over a 
specific functional area of infonnation or expertise. '!his study 
doa.nnented the fact that not only are there vastly different kirrls 
of decisions to be made, but that the involvement of decision-makers 
deperrls upon a complex assortment of variables which interact in a 
given situation. 
Important Empirical Findings 
Given that this study focuses upon small MHSs, it was expected 
that fairly strong corporate influence would be fourrl within the 
system management, since corporate leaders have relatively fewer 
hospitals to manage. However, the high degree to which hospital 
CEOs perceived corporate control over hospital decisions was s0me­
what surprising. On a scale with the value 3 indicating strong 
system control and 21 irrlicating strong hospital control , the mean 
level of perceiVed control was 7 . 65 for periodic decisions and 7 . 81 
for tactical decisions. It is evident that, at least in regard to 
the two decision areas studied, the MHS central office � a 
tremendous influence upon hospital decision-making processes within 
the small systems sampled. 
However, this sb.ldy illustrates that there are contingencies 
under which hospitals can exert greater control over certain types 
of decisions. Because of the differences in strategic decision 
types , the discussion of significant findings will be organized 
arourrl each type of decision, L e . , tactical and periodic, and will 
include canparisons of the current findings to previous work. 
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Tactical Decisions 
'lhree system-level measures are significant in their associa­
tion with hospital control over tactical decisions : catholic system 
CMI'lership, Prospector system strategy, an::l system age. 
Hospital members of catholic systems have significantly lOOre 
control over tactical decisions than other hospitals. '!he original 
IOOdel sought to test for the effect of not-for-profit system 0wner­
ship, but the well-documented statistical strength of catholic CMI'l­
ership overshadowed the effects of other ownership categories. 
'lhese firrlings confirm the hypothesis that not-for-profit ownership 
alone cannot explain variance in the extent of hospital control over 
strategic decisions. 
No previous research had addressed the application of the Miles 
an::l Snovl ( 1978) strategic typology to MRS decision-maki.rq. 'Ibis 
study offered an initial look at the rrodel ' s  application to MRS 
research. Hospitals belonging to systems which aggressively ac­
quired new member hospitals (prospectors , according to luke an::l 
Begun (1986» have significantly less control over tactical deci­
sions than hospitals whose corporate component pursu€d leSs aggres­
si ve strategies, contral:y to the hypothesis . It appears that rather 
than acquiring hospitals rapidly an::l then gradually integrating them 
into the system ' s  management structure, prospector systems acquire a 
hospital an::l then strongly take control of its tactical management. 
A plausible explanation for this phenomena is that systems which 
exparrl rapidly may do so by acquiring financially or otherwise trou­
bled facilities. strong management involvement in everyday opera-
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tions may be need  to tw:n these hospitals around. 
Hospitals belonging to nore recently incorporated systems re­
tain greater control over their tactical decisions than hospital 
members of relatively older systems . It may require some time be­
fore the integration of hospitals into a newly fonned system can 
occur. New systems may take time to test arrl evaluate the nost 
effective methods of control over their hospitals, in contrast with 
older systems which have gained managerial experience through years 
of MHS operation. 
Previous research had documented a U-shaped relationship bet­
ween system age arrl hospital control over decisions (Alexarrler, 
1985 ; Barrett, 1979 ; Money, et al . , 1976) . Tests did not corrobor­
ate the U-shaped relationship in the sample urrler investigation, as 
the relationship between age arrl hospital control over tactical 
decisions was nore linear for this sample. '!hat is, while younger 
system hospitals (age 1-10 years) have significantly greater con­
trol , middle-aged (11-40 years) arrl older (40+ years) systems are 
similar in exhibiting a negative arrl insignificant relationship to 
hospital control over tactical decisions. 
'IWo variables approached significance in their relationship to 
hospital control over tactical decision-making. SUl:prisingly, with 
catholic system ownership arrl system age effects partialed out, hos­
pitals in older, nore proxbnal systems appear to have less control 
than their dispersed counterparts . It is evident that when concen­
trated geographically, hospitals in older systems do not possess the 
extensive control which can be fourrl in dispersed systems in this 
sanple. '!he prox:ilnity of hospitals to each other ar:rl to system 
headquarters appears to negate the ability of hospitals in older 
systems to retain a great deal of independence. 
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Hospitals which are owned by the MHS have less control over 
tactical decisions, len:ling support to the hypothesis that corporate 
headquarters is more invested in the operation of hospitals which 
are owned. '!his was the only hospital level variable which had any 
notable ilrpact on hospital control over tactical decisions. 
Periodic Decisions 
Although the overall predictive model for periodic decisions 
was stronger than that for tactical decisions, only one system-Ievel 
(system age) ar:rl one hospital-level variable (hospital owned by MHS) 
were significantly related to hospital control over periodic stra­
tegic decisions. '!he age of the system appears to be a strong fac­
tor in corporate control over periodic hospital decisions: hospi­
tals in younger systems have significantly greater control than 
those in older systems . '!he hospitals ' previous existence as in­
dependent facilities comes strongly to bear as the hospi�s retain 
control of the less frequent strategic decisions . Older systems , in 
contrast, seem to have achieved a degree of integration of periodic 
hospital decisions into co1:pOrate processes , as hospital IOOmbers 
have significantly less control . 
As expected , hospitals which are owned by the MHS have less 
control over periodic strategic decisions. 'Ihis lends support to 
the propositions made by Fattier et al. (1982) ar:rl Aldrich (1979 ) . 
It follows logically that systems are more invested from . a starrl-
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p::>int of resources , time, personnel , and p::>tential for financial 
gain in hospitals which they own as opposed to ones which they lease 
or manage. '!he fact that the effect is stronger for periodic than 
for tactical decisions reflects the longer tenn and broader bnpact 
of periodic decisions. 
'1hree additional variables approached significance in their 
relationship to hospital control over periodic decisions. Relative 
to smaller systems , hospital rrembers of larger systems had greater 
control over periodic decisions. '!his supports the reasoning of 
Provan ( 1985) and is consistent with the relationship which was hy­
p::>thesized. Although nore work is need  to confinn the nature of 
this relationship, it offers preliminary support for the theory that 
as MHS size increases , it is less likely that corporate headquarters 
will become actively involved in periodic strategic decisions of 
each of its member hospitals .  
Interestingly, larger hospitals terrl to have less control than 
smaller hospitals over periodic strategic decisions, although the 
relationship is not significant. It is probable that the MHS has 
nore to gain or lose fran the decisions made relatirig to larger fa­
cilities in cc:arparison to smaller hospitals,  thus there is nore 
involvement in the periodic decisions of larger hospitals .  
Finally, weak support for the concept of a dominant parent hos­
pital in a system is shown. Parent hospitals have slightly more 
(but statistically insignificant) control over their periodic deci­
sions than non-originating rrembers of MHSs . 
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Differential Effects of Independent Variables Across Decision Areas 
'IWo indeperrlent variables exerted strong, consistent effects 
across both tactical and periodic decisions: system age and hos­
pitals owned by the MHS . Younger hospitals retained Irore extensive 
control over tactical decisions when the effects of geographic dis­
persion were controlled. Younger hospitals had greater control over 
periodic decisions regardless of geographic dispersion. '!his con­
sistency points to the likelihood that full integration and control 
in a newly established MHS takes tbte, and that newly incorporated 
systems do not seem to acquire a hospital and then seize strong con­
trol . A good deal of hospital indeperrlence is retained initially. 
Consistent effects for both types of decisions were observed 
for hospital members of systems which are owned by the system as 0p­
posed to leased or managed. It appears that system headquarters 
have greater psychological and resource investment in hospitals that 
are owned , and therefore system managers become Irore involved in 
decisions nade regarding these hospitals. 
Hospitals belonging to catholic systems had nuch greater con­
trol over tactical decisions than hospitals in other ownersru.p 
categories , but the same effect did not hold true for periodic deci­
sions. It appears that the well known catholic system "hands off" 
philosophy of management of hospital operations was derronstrated for 
tactical decisions, but that catholic system leaders draw the line 
and become just as involved as non-catholic system leaders when it 
comes to decisions having longer tenn and broader ilrpact, i . e . , 
periodic decisions . 
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Hospital nembers of prospector systems had significantly less 
control Oller tactical decisions, but were no different than other 
systems in the arount of control Oller periodic decisions. This is 
possibly due to the nature of the measurement of prospector systems , 
which emphasized recent growth in categorizing a system as a pros­
pector. A recently-expancled system may not have had sufficient tbre 
to establish control mechanisms Oller the periodic decisions of its 
hospitals that it has made Oller tactical , shorter-tenn decisions. 
Evaluation of the Usefulness of the Contingency Perspective 
In Cllapter two, several limitations of the contingency perspec­
tive were pointed out . Specifically, that contingency theory is 
"not a theory at all , "  (SchoonhOllen, 1981) an::l is a convenient 
vehicle with which to test relationships between variables rather 
than a testable "theory. " 
In this work, the propensity for the contingency perspective to 
act as a variable testing vehicle became apparent. '!he analytical 
m::x:lel for this research was based upon the orienting framework or 
''metatheory'' (Fry & Smith, 1987) that an organization ' s  structure 
deperrls upon its strategy, technology, an::l envirornnent. within that 
framework, a true theory-testing study would have obtained com­
prehensi ve measures of organizational strategy, technology, environ­
ment, an::l structure to test the con�ency theory. 
'!his research was one step below this level , testing contingent 
relationships between variables representing aspects of MHS stra­
tegy, envirornnent, an::l structure. '!hus it does not pravide a clear 
test of the contingency m::x:lel as a theory, but instead investigates 
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the nature of certain contingent relationships. '!his distinction is 
:i.Irp)rtant to urrlerstarrl, as it implies that the true worthiness of 
the contingency rodel as a theory :remains untested in this work. 
'IWo major advantages derived fram the use of the contingency 
perspective as the analytical framework for this study: a) the in­
corporation aro testing of a CCIlTprehensive range of in:lepeIrlent var­
iables; aro b) the direct applicability of results to administrators 
in the field (a topic addressed in the next section) . 
While overall , the contingency perspective was useful for this 
study, the explanatory power of the regression rodels was lower than 
expected. Only one hospital-level variable was significantly re­
lated to hospital control over strategy (ownership of the hospital 
by the system) . It is believed that these unexpected results are 
due to measurement problems rather than to the weakness of the 
analytical framework. 
Several variables which have shown clear effects in previous 
research were not dem:>nstrated to have effects in this study. Ge0-
graphic dispersion has been shown to be strongly related to decen­
tralized management in MRSs (Alexarrler, 1985 ; Alexarrler &" Schroer, 
1985 ; Kochen, 1981) . In this study, geographic dispersion exerted 
influence only through its interaction with the variable system age, 
in that hospitals in older, dispersed systems have greater control 
over the decisions than do hospitals in newer, proxiInal systems . 
'!he size of the MRS did not relate significantly to hospital 
control over either type of decision. Organizational literature has 
shown that as size increases beyon::l a certain point, management de-
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centralizes, giving lOC>re control to subunits . '!he failure to demon­
strate an effect of size in this study most probably relates to the 
restricted size range of the sample. An additional possibility is 
the insensitivity of the IreaSUre of size, the number of hospitals in 
the system, which was inco:r:porated. When studying small MHSs, a 
lOC>re specific IreaSUre of size is required. 
Higher occupancy was hypothesized to predict greater hospital 
control over decisions, based on the premise that lower occupancy 
spelled greater deperrlence on the MHS am thus less power for the 
hospital . 'Ibis was not fourrl. Occupancy is a weak IreaSUre of the 
hospital ' s  power-depenjence relationship with the system, as oocu­
pancy noN has reduced implications for hospital perfonnance urrler 
the prospective payment system. Maintiaining a high rate of admis­
sions has become a goal which is often lOC>re important than a high 
occupancy rate, since hospital managers are noN reimbursed on a per 
case basis for many patients. 
Finally, the competitiveness of the market area did not relate 
to hospital control over decisions in this study. A depenjent var­
iable which lOC>re specifically IreaSUreS strategic moves taken by the 
hospital in a competitive local market would make the competitive­
ness of the market area lOC>re relevant as an explanato:t:y variable. 
As it was employed in this research , the IreaSUre of competitiveness 
- hospital beds in the area - did not have any bearing over the 
broad types of decisions under study. 
Policy am Management Implications 
'!he firrlings diso..lssed above have implications for managers in 
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MHS hospitals arrl for their corporate leaders . First, the control 
retained by hospitals over strategic decisions is contingent upon 
the type of decision as well as other variables. For example, hos­
pitals in catholic systems give up rrore control over tactical deci­
sions than over periodic decisions . Managers must be aware that the 
nature of the decision to be made is relevant in deciding where to 
place responsibility for a certain function. 
5ecorrl, managers of systems in the earlier stages of growth 
must be aware that it takes t.iIre to integrate hospitals into the 
system ani that control mechanisms are unlikely to be implemented 
quickly. 'lhis fin::ling can be viewed fram two perspectives: a} that 
managers of member hospitals in a newly fonned system tend to resist 
system controls or b} that new system leaders do not impose strong 
controls on member hospitals.  '!here may be an initial period of 
exper.iIrentation with various mechanisms for ani levels of system 
controls over hospital decisions, a period which managers should 
realistically view as a t.iIre for gaining experience in hospital­
system relationships . 
'lhi.rd, hospitals which are considering leased, managed, or 
owned relationships with a system should take into account the fin­
ding that owned hospitals, in general , have less control over both 
Jci.ros of decisions under investigation in this study . If a hospital 
wishes to retain control over its local market tactics ani its 
periodic decisions, then its managers should find a system to manage 
or lease the hospital rather than selling the hospital to a system. 
Fourth, hospitals which are not originating members of the sys-
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tem can expect that they will hold less control over their periodic 
decisions than their "parent" counterparts. '!his expectation can 
help them deal with perceiVed differential treabnent they receive. 
Fifth, c:x::amoon wisdan am previous research has led hospital 
managers to expect to retain a good deal of control over their deci­
sions when they are members of a geographically dispersed system. 
'!his study has shown that geographic dispersion is not such a simple 
phenarenon. System geographic dispersion alone cannot explain the 
degree of control held by hospitals;  however it can alter the ef­
fects of other variables, as delOOnstrated in this study . 
Sixth, in this sample, hospital ems perceived that corporate 
headquarters held a substantial degree of control over hospital tac­
tical am periodic decisions. '!he degree of system control is high 
even in the small systems examined in this study . 'Ihe delivery of 
health care services is unique in the extreme ilTIportance of local 
influences (e.g. , medical staffs, insurance arrangements, ercpleyer 
contracting) (Illke & Begun, 1986) . 'Ihus the firxting of substantial 
corporate control supports the need for attention to the potential 
conflict between local hospital am system goals. '!his area of 
policy concezn is likely to becane more czucial as laxger rn.nnbers of 
hospitals join systems in the future . 
Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations of this work revealed specific areas where futu...""e 
research could improve the understanding of the nature of the rela­
tionships between hospitals and their corporate headquarters . 
since this research by design was restricted to the investiga-
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tion of small MHSs arrl the sanpling strategy over-represented cath­
olic arrl not-for-profit systems, generalizability of this research 
is most appropriate for the management of small , catholic, arrl not­
for-profit systems . 
Use of the contingency frarrework can offer managers broad 
guidance as to the contingencies Which interact in given managerial 
situations arrl effective behaviors given those conditions. If the 
contingency perspective (or arrf perspective) is to contribute to 
future managerial decision-making in health care, however, a better 
typology of hospital-related decisions must be developed in order to 
facilitate clearer guidelines for effective management urxler certain 
contingencies . An improved deperrlent variable scale would enhance 
future research relating to strategic management in MHSs. Although 
scaling procedures in this study allowed for the discennnent of 
patterns based upon different types of strategic decisions, a scale 
could be constructed to better address the process, content, arrl 
involvement of various personnel in strategic decision-making. '!he 
current items composing the deperrlent variables were a select few 
chosen from a weakly-validated yet widely used instnnnent. 
Future research would be wise to build upon the work of 
Hickson, et al .  (1986) . An ilrproved scale would contain a list of 
strategic decisions which had been constructed so as to represent 
each of the three types of strategic decisions identified by Hickson 
et al .  (1986) : vortex, sporadic� tractable, fluid� arrl familiar, 
constricted. In this way, concrete actions which could be taken by 
hospitals in competitive situations would be addressed. Hospital 
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managers could be asked to respond to these decisions in tenns of a) 
the frequency of corporate involvement in those specific decisions ; 
and b) the type of control exercised by corporate leaders, such as 
direct supel:Vision, input control , behavior control , or output 
control . 
In other words, the types of decisions addressed must be much 
nore specific and the IreaSUremeIlt scale relating to those decisions 
must relate to concrete actions taken by the parties involved. In 
this way, independent variables representing characteristics of the 
system, the hospital , and the market area could be directly tied to 
specific types of strategic decisions. By pre-selecting the typol­
CXJY of decisions to be used, statements could be made about the 
extent of corporate involvement in certain types of decisions. 
It is difficult to quantify the process of organizational deci­
sion-making using cross-sectional , survey studies • Given the dy­
namic nature of the decision-making process, it appears that a 
sophisticated instnnnent must be devised to neasure the decision­
making process or that a process-evaluation research design must be 
implemented in order to successfully reveal the subtletieS of the 
relationships involved. Neither is the case in the present work. 
'!his topic is well-suited to the con::luct of subjective/case study 
designs, which would be ideal if used in conjunction with the type 
of survey instnnnent described above. 
Several of the independent variables in this study were not 
appropriately specified, in particular the measure of system size, 
hospital ocx::upancy , and market area competition. The number of hos-
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pitals in the system was used as an irrlicator of size in order to 
replicate the fWings of previous research; however for work with 
small hospital systems, a more sensitive neasure of hospital size 
must be utilized. 
Because there were few previous studies to guide the specifica­
tion arrl measurement of hospital level variables relating to deci­
sion-making control by hospitals arrl corporate management, hospital­
level variables were given an initial test by this work. Hospital 
occupancy arrl the c::orrpetitiveness of the hospital market area did 
not show any relationship to control over hospital decision-making 
as expected . FUture research should utilize better irrlicators of 
hospital perfonnance; cx::cupancy is a particularly poor perfonnance 
neasure tmder the prospective payment system. 
In addition, the length of hospital involvement in the MHS was 
not used as an iroeperrlent variable in this work, in order to reduce 
the model ' s  multicollinearity. since system age was such an ilnpor­
tant variable in this study, the inclusion of duration of hospital 
participation in the MHS would appear to be strongly warranted for 
future work. 
Finally, in the future it will be ilnportant to clarify the .lin­
pact of decentralized decision-making upon hospital arrl system per­
fonnance. While preliminary studies such as this will reveal the 
best predictors of locus of control over hospital-level decisions, 
future research must judge the ultbnate impact of these management 
structures on the quality of care delivered by arrl the financial 
perfonnance of system hospitals . 
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C O N  F 1 D E N  T 1 A L 
NAME OF HOS P ITAL :  
_
_
____
_
____
_________ 
_ 
S ECT I ON I .  P l ease ra te each of the fo l l owi ng s t rateg i e s  f rom two 
perspecti v e s ; 
Not 
C i rcl e a numb e r  from 1 to 7 ' wh i ch re p reseQts t h e  re l a t i ve i mp o rtance of the 
s trategy to your hospi tal ' s  l ong -term s u rv i v a l ; a n d  
" X "  a numbe r f rom 1 t o  7 w h i ch rep re sents t h e  rel a t i v e  i mp o rtance o f  the 
s t ra tegy to you r  corpo ra te o rgan i z a t i o n ' s  l o ng -term s u ry i val . 
Ext reme l y  
I mpo rta nt Impo rta nt 
fo r 
Long-Te rm 
S u rv i v a 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4  
2 3 4  
2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4  
2 3 4 
for 
Long-Term 
S u rv i va l  
5 6 7 
5 6 7 
5 6 7 
5 6 7 
5 6 7  
5 6 7  
5 6 7  
5 6 7 
5 6 7 
5 6 7 
a .  P u r s u e  contracts w i th HNOs o r  othe r 
i ns u rance sys tems 
b .  P u rs u e  contracts wi t h  l a rg e  
empl oye rs ( e . g . , wel l ne s s  p ro grams , 
i nd u s tri a l  med i ci ne ,  PPOs ) 
c .  Expand the b read th a nd/ o r  depth of 
t ra d i t i o n a l  i n p a t i e n t  s e rv i ces 
d .  Expand c l i n i ca l  s e rv i ces o t h e r  than 
t ra d i ti o n a l  i np at i e n t  care ( e . g . , 
amb u l atory , l on � - term , we l l ne s s , 
s u b s ta nce a b u s e ) 
e .  Expand non-cl i n i ca l  a reas of 
ho s p i ta l  s e rv i ce ,  u ti l i z i ng exi s t i ng 
h o s p i tal capab i l i t i e s ( e . g . , l a u n d ry 
s e rv i ce , c o n t ra c t  ma n a g emen t .  
computer s e rv i ces ) 
f . Expand non-hea l th c a re b u s i n e s ses 
( e . g . , hotel s and re s ta u ra n t s  
o u t s i de o f  the ho s p i tal ) 
g .  Speci a l i z e i n  s e l ected i np a t i e n t  
s e rv i ces 
h .  Add nea rby h o s p i ta l s  to t h e  e x i s t i n g  
sys tem 
i .  Add d i s ta n t  ho s p i t a l s to the 
e x i s t 1 n g  system 
j .  S t ri v e  fo r a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  i d e n t i ty 
among compe t i to rs 
Not Extreme l y  
Important Importa nt 
for for 
long-Tenn Long -Te rm 
S u rv i  va 1 Su rv i va l 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
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k . 
1 . 
m .  
n .  
o .  
p .  
q . 
r .  
s .  
t .  
u .  
v .  
w .  
x .  
S t ri ve fo r  a p o s i t i o n  of cos t 
l eade rs h i p  amo n g  compe t i t o rs 
Ga i n  g reate r access to capi tal i n  
o rd e r  to s u pport new v e n tures 
Devel o p  the capa c i ty to move qu i c k l y 
to pre empt compe t i tors ' movemen t  
i nto ex i s t i ng o r  p o t e nt i a l  ma rke ts 
I mp l eme n t  a mo re p a rt i c i patory 
management s tyl e 
I nc rea s e  phys i c i a n  i nv o l vement 
corpo rate d e c i s i o n -ma k i ng 
I nc re a s e  phy s i c i a n  i nv o l v ement 
hospi tal dec i s i on-ma k i n g  
t n 
i n  
I ncrea s e  hos p i ta l  ma nageme nt s t a f f  
i nvol v eme n t  i n  c o rpo rate 
deci s i on-ma k i ng 
I nc rea s e  c o rp o ra te control  over 
i nd i v i du a l  h o s p i ta l ope ra t i onal 
deci s i o n -ma k i ng 
I nc rea s e  c o rp o rate control  over 
i nd i v i du a l  hos p i tal s t rat eg i c 
deci  s i on-ma k i  ng  
I nc re a s e  re s ou rc e s  d e v o tee to the 
ma rket i n g funct i o n at the i nd i v i d u a l  
hospi tal  l ev e l  
I n c re a s e  re sou rce s devoted to the 
ma rke t i ng fu n ct i o n at the corpo r � te 
l ev e l  
I n c re a se re sou rce s d evoted to the  
s t ra te g i c p l a n n i n g fu n c t i on 
i nd i v i du a l  hospi ta l l ev e l  
a t  the  
I nc re a s e  re s o u r c e s  devoted  to the 
s t rateg i c  p l a n n i ng functi on at the 
co rpo ra t e l e v e l 
S treng the n the o rg a n i z a t i on ' s  i ma g e  
i n  t h e  e y e s  o f  i t s " p u b l i c s "  ( e . g . , 
commu n i ty phy s i c i a n s , b u s i n e s s 
commu n i ty ,  reg u l a to r s ) 
S ECT I O N  I ! .  
Rank f o r  
Hos p i ta 1 
- 3 -
. P l ease ran k  the fol l owi ng s t rateg i c  a c t i o n s  acco rd i ng t o  the i r 
i mporta nce to t h e  l ong-tenn s u rv i val o f  you r hos p i ta l and the 
corporate . o rga n i z a t i o n  to wh i ch you b e l o ng ( 1 i s  the h i ghest 
ra nk i ng , 4 i s  t h e  l owe st ) . 
Rank for 
Co rporati on 
a .  The mos t  i mportant s trateg i c  a c t i o n  o u r  
o rgan i z at i o n  cou l d  take i s  t o  expand t h e  overa l l 
s ca l e  o f  ou r o rg a n i zati o n .  
b .  The mos t  i mpo rta nt s t rateg i c  act i on o u r  
o rg an i za t i o n  cou l d t a k e  i s  to ach i eve a l ow co s t  
pos i ti on re l a t i v e  t o  o u r  competi to rs . 
c .  The mo s t  i mportant s t rateg i c  a c t i o n  o u r  • 
orga n i zati on cou l d take i s  to a c h i eve a h i gh ' 
qua l i ty pos i t i o n  re l a ti ve to ou r competi tors : 
d .  The mo s t  i mportant s t �ateg i c  a c t i on ou r 
o rga n i zati o n  cou l d  take i s  to b roaden the 
d i ve rs i ty of o u r  s e rv i ce / p roduct mi x .  
S ECTI ON I I I .  P l e a s e  ra n k  the fol l owi ng s t ra teg i c  a c t i o n s  accord i ng to the i r  
i mportance to the l o ng - tenn s u rv i val  o f  y o u r  h os p i ta l  a nd the 
c o rp o rate org� n i z a t i o n  to wh i ch you b e l o ng ( 1  i s  the h i gh e s t  
ra n k i ng , 3 i s  t h e  l owe st ) . 
Ra n k  fo r 
H o s p i ta l  
Rank fo r 
Co rpo ra t i on 
a .  The mos t  i mport a n t  s tra teg i c  a c t i o n  o u r  
o rga n i z a t i on cou l d  t a k e  i s  t o  i mp rove i ts 
o rga n i z a t i o n a l  s t ruct u re . 
. 
b .  The mo s t  i mp o rtant s t rateg i c  a c t i o n  o u r  
o rga n i z a t i o n  cou l d t a k e  i s  to i mp rove i t s i n t e rna l 
c u l  tu re / c l  � ma te . 
c .  The mo s t  i mportant s t r a t eg i c a c t i on ou r 
o r ga n i z a t i on cou l d  t a k e  i s  to i mp rove i t s  ma rket 
s trategy ( i e s ) . 
S ECT I ON I V .  
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P l e a s e  ra te the e x t e n t  t o  wh i ch t h e  f o l l owi ng bel i ef s  a re 
predomi nant i n  you r h o s p i tal  a nd i n  t h e - co rpo rate o r g a n i z a t i on t o  
Whl Ch you be l ong , wi th 1 represent i ng " no t  a t  a l l p redomi n a n t"  
and 7 "extremely p redomi na nt . "  
- - C i rcl e a number wh i ch rep resents p redomi nance i n  you r h o spi tal ; a n d  
- - " X "  a numb e r  wh i ch repre s ents p redomi nance i n  you r c o rpo rat e  o rga n i z a t i o n . 
N ot a t  Al l  E x t reme l y  
P redomi nant P redomi nant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a .  The b e l i ef t h a t  h e a l th c a re i s  a 
r i g h t  fo r a l l 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 b .  The bel i e f t h a t  heal th c a re i s  
p r i ma ri l y  a bu s i nes s 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 c .  The b e l i ef t h a t  emp l oye e  
p a rt i c i p a t i o n  i n  o r ga n i z a t i o n a l  
d e c i s i o n -ma k i ng l ea d s  to i nc re a s e d  
o rgani z a t i o n a l  e ffect i v en e s s 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 d .  The bel i e f t h a t  phys i c i a n  
p a rt i c i p a t i on i n  o r ga n l z a t i o n a l  
deci s i on-ma k i n g  l e a d s  to i n c re a sed 
o rga n i z a t i o n a l effect i v e ne s s  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 e .  The b e l i e f t h a t  a p ro f i t  mo t i v a t i on 
l eads to i nc re a s e d  o rg a n i z a t i ona l 
effect i ve ne s s  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 f .  The bel i e f t h a t  centra l i z ed 
o rga n i z a t i o n a l  a rrangeme n t s  1 e a d  t o  
i nc re a s e d  o rg a n i z a t i o n a l  
effecti v e n e s s 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 g .  The bel i ef that gove rnme n t  mu s t  p l ay 
a s i g n i f i ca n t  ro l e  i n  a s s u r i ng 
acce s s  to h e a l t h  ca re 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 h .  The bel i e f t h a t  h o s p i t a l s  a re 
p ri ma r i l y  commu n i ty s e rv i c e 
o rg a n i z a t i o n s  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 i .  The bel i e f t h a t  compe t i t i o n i n  
h e a l th ca re d e l i v e ry i s  s u p e r i o r  to 
regu l a t i o n  
SECT I O N  V . 
No 
I nf l u e n ce 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
S ECT I ON V I . 
Low 
Deg ree 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
2 3 
- 5 -
L i s t e d  b e l ow a re sev e ra l  types o f  d ec i s i on s  ma d e  a b o u t  i nd i v i d u a l  
hospi t a l  o p e ra ti ons a n d  manageme n t . F o r  e a c h  type o f decl s l o n , 
how mu c h  i n fl uence does the c o rpo ra te o f f i ce o f  th i s  
mu l t i ho s p i tal  system have? (C i rcle one number . ) 
G reat Deal 
o f  I nfl uence 
4 5 6 7 a .  Ap po i ntme n t  o f  l oc a l  b o a rd membe rs. 
4 5 6 7 b .  Appo i n tme n t  o f  hos p i t a l  CEO 
4 5 6 7 c .  P e rfo rma nce e v a l u a t i o n  o f ho s p i ta l 
CEO 
4 5 6 7 d .  S a l e  o f  h o s p i t a l  a s s e t� 
4 5 6 7 e .  Pu rch a s e  o f  h o s p i tal  a s s ets v a l ued 
g re a t e r  t h a n  $ 1 00 ,000 
4 5 6 7 f .  C h a n g e  i n  h o s p i ta l by l a\�� 
4 5 6 7 g . Med i ca l  s ta f f  p ri v i l eg e s  
4 5 6 7 h .  Hos p i ta l  o p e ra t i n g bu dgets 
4 5 6 7 i . S e rv i c e  a dd i t i o n s  a t  the h o s p i tal 
l evel  
4 5 6 7 :i .  Fo rmu l a t i on o f hos p i t a l  
s t ra te g i es / l ong ra nge p l ans 
P l e a s e  a n sw e r  the fo l l owi n g qu e s t i on s  a t o u t  c h a ,'a c t e r i  s t i  c s  o f  
th i s  mu l t i h o s p i ta l sys tem . C i  rcl e a numb e r f rom 1 to 7 i n  
re s po n s e  to e a c h  que s t i on .  
H i g h 
Deg ree 
4 5 6 7 a .  To wh a t  d e g ree i s  t h e re confl i ct 
b e tween the mi s s i o n s  o f  memb e r  
h o s p i ta l s a nd the co rpo rate 
o rg a n i z a t i o n ? 
4 5 f. b .  To wh a t  deg ree i s  d e c i s i o n -ma k i ng 
p owe r co n c e n t r a ted a t the co rpo ra te 
o rg a n i z 3 t � o n l e v e l ? 
4 5 6 7 c .  To wh a t  deg ree i s  t h e re confl i ct 
b e tween t h e  s t rategi e s  o f  membe r  
h o s p i t a l s a nd the corpo ra te 
o rg a n i z a t i o n ?  
4 5 6 7 d ,  T o  �Ih a t  deg ree d o  memb e r  h o s p i t a l  
C EO s  h a v e  co n f l i ct i ng l oya l t i e s 
b e tween t h e i r ho s p i ta l s  a nd the 
c o rp o ra t e  o rga n i za t i o n? 
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S ECT I ON V I I . P l ease p rov i de the fol l ow i n g  i n fo rma t i o n  a b o u t  th i s  ho s p i ta l ' s  
gove rn i ng boa rd and the b o a rd ' s  execu t i v e  commi ttee a t  the end 
o f  1984 . I ncl u de o n l y  membe rs w i th ful l v o t i ng p r i v i leges . 
a .  What i s  the s i z e of th i s  hos p i tal ' s  gov e r n i ng b o a rd ?  
( 1 ) How ma ny of those memb e rs a re phys i c i a n s ?  
( 2 ) How many of those members a re a p po i n te d  by t h e  co rporate orga n i z a t i o n  
of th i s  sys tem? 
b .  What i s  the s i z e  of the board ' s  execu t i ve commi t t e e ?  
( 1 ) How many of those membe rs a re phys i c i a n s ?  
( 2 ) How ma ny of tho s e  membe rs a re appo i n ted by the co rpo rate orga n i z a t i on 
of t h i  s sys tem? __ _ 
SECT I ON V I I I .  How ma ny years have you been emp l oyed i n  a ma n ageme n t  
pcs i ti on i n  th i s  organ i za t i o n ?  
____ yea rs 
THAN K YOU V ERY MUCH . 
P l e a se re tu rn i n  the  encl o s ed , pre-addre s s e d  e n v e l o p e  o r  s e n d  to O r .  Ro i ce D .  
L u k e , Ch a i rma n , Depa rtme n t  o f  H e a l th Admi n i s t r a t i o n ,  a t  t h e  a d d re s s  o n  the  fro n t  
co v e r .  
